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DOUBLE STANDARDS: AN EMPIRICAL
STUDY OF PATENT AND TRADEMARK
DISCIPLINE
JON J. LEE *
Abstract: Our legal system is built on the foundation that lawyers have a number
of coexisting and sometimes conflicting duties—to their clients, to others who
might be affected by their practice, and to the effective and equitable administration of justice. Although most lawyers fulfill these duties ethically, invariably
some fail to live up to these expectations. For this reason, all states have created
disciplinary authorities to regulate and sanction lawyer misconduct. Interestingly,
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) is one of the few agencies to have developed its own disciplinary system for policing the conduct of
those who practice before it. The USPTO’s need to regulate the conduct of
trademark attorneys and patent practitioners is largely due to the critical role that
these professionals play in the provision of intellectual property rights. Yet the
existence of this analogous disciplinary system is little more than window dressing if the USPTO does not leverage its authority to ensure that those it regulates
conform their conduct to the ethical standards of the profession. Through innovative empirical methods marshalling data over sixteen years from disciplinary authorities throughout the country, this Article shows that the USPTO is not only
failing to discipline bad actors with regularity, but also overlooking the types of
misconduct that threaten to undercut the provision of intellectual property rights
that are in the public interest.

INTRODUCTION
Intellectual property is often one of the most valuable—and hotly contested—assets of a corporation. 1 A utility patent provides its holder with twenty
© 2020, Jon J. (McClanahan) Lee. All rights reserved.
* Jon J. (McClanahan) Lee is a Professor of Practice at the University of Minnesota Law School.
The author wishes to thank Tom Cotter, Deborah Gerhardt, Garry Jenkins, Bert Kritzer, Bill
McGeveran, Chrystal Tomblyn, and the participants at the 19th Annual Intellectual Property Scholars
Conference at DePaul University College of Law.
NOTE: Because some platforms do not reproduce images, we have archived all graphics herein at
https://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/61-5/Lee%20Graphics.
pdf [https://perma.cc/6V7X-7TGV].
1
See, e.g., Jack Nicas, Apple and Samsung End Smartphone Patent Wars, N.Y. TIMES (June 27,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/technology/apple-samsung-smartphone-patent.html [https://
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years of exclusive use over the patented invention, during which time the holder can choose to sell the invention itself or license the right to make use of the
invention to others for a sizeable fee. 2 For example, Lipitor, the cholesterollowering drug, generated approximately $130 billion for Pfizer just during the
fourteen years it was sold under patent protection. 3 Following expiration, its
sales dipped from more than $10 billion annually to just over $2 billion 4—a
dramatic hit to be sure, but still likely allowing Pfizer to benefit from the consumer recognition of its established brand. 5
Though “patent wars” may grab headlines in the popular media, 6 trademarks arguably have even greater influence because they may exist in perpetuity and are ubiquitous in their reach across industries and sectors. 7 At the 141st
Annual Meeting of the International Trademark Association in 2019, Andrei
Iancu, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) Director, touted the
power of trademark protection in building a brand, noting that “trademark applicants have, on average, 34% higher employment and 24% greater revenue in
the period following first filing, compared to a control group of non-filers.” 8
Indeed, a 2011 study found that Google’s trademark was worth an estimated

perma.cc/SN9N-ZPJW] (discussing the end of a seven-year legal fight between Apple and Samsung over
smartphone technology, involving several lawsuits).
2
See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2018) (explaining content and terms of patent rights).
3
Editorial, Lessons from Lipitor and the Broken Blockbuster Drug Model, 378 THE LANCET
1976, 1976 (2011).
4
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, PFIZER, INC., ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K) 26 (2018) (reporting
annual sales of Lipitor); see Duff Wilson, Facing Generic Lipitor Rivals, Pfizer Battles to Protect Its
Cash Cow, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/30/health/generic-lipitorsets-off-an-aggressive-push-by-pfizer.html [https://perma.cc/AW9A-QCK6] (describing Pfizer’s strategy to avoid losses upon the expiration of the Lipitor patent).
5
See Jing Luo et al., Effect of Generic Competition on Atorvastatin Prescribing and Patients’
Out-of-Pocket Spending, 176 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1317, 1318 (2016) (presenting the results of a
study of consumer spending on Lipitor after patent expiration, suggesting that many continued to
spend more for the brand name).
6
“Patent wars” refer to the contentious litigation between entities over patent rights. See, e.g.,
Nicas, supra note 1 (reporting on the legal battle over patent rights between Apple and Samsung). See
generally THOMAS F. COTTER, PATENT WARS: HOW PATENTS IMPACT OUR DAILY LIVES (2018)
(providing a comprehensive examination of patent laws and litigation).
7
ECON. & STATISTICS ADMIN. & U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE U.S. ECONOMY: 2016 UPDATE, at ii (2016), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/IPandtheUSEconomySept2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5CB-SUXD] (“Trademark-intensive
industries are the largest in number and contribute the most employment with 23.7 million jobs in
2014 . . . .”).
8
Andrei Iancu, Dir., U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Remarks by Director Iancu at International
Trademark Association 141st Annual Meeting (May 21, 2019) [hereinafter Iancu, Remarks at International Trademark Association], https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/remarks-director-iancuinternational-trademark-association-141st-annual [https://perma.cc/K2R6-5CDD].
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$44.3 billion, just inching out Microsoft’s trademark that was estimated to be
worth $42.8 billion. 9
But there exists an even broader perspective on the reach of intellectual
property, one that extends beyond the immediate profit potential for those who
hold its rights. 10 Scholars long have advanced the argument that intellectual
property rights may themselves serve as conduits to advancing public interests. 11 Under this theory, patents are awarded to inventors so that inventors will
share their inventions with others—thereby benefitting the public interest. 12
Trademarks are valuable because they provide consumers a “shortcut to finding the products they desire,” while the federal registration system simultaneously provides protection for businesses that wish to carve out a space for
themselves in the marketplace. 13 Although this theory is not without criticisms, 14 the USPTO itself has repeatedly posited that all of its decisions affect
the public interest. 15
At the same time, the implications for under-regulation of intellectual
property rights may be far-reaching. On the heels of the catastrophic implosion
of Theranos, the infamous health company that falsely claimed to have developed revolutionary blood tests, the media called out the USPTO for its role in
granting Elizabeth Holmes the credibility she needed to attract investors and
business partners through the issuance of several patents. 16 Even after the details of the Theranos scam came to light, the USPTO issued the alreadydefunct company five additional patents. 17 On the trademark side, recently
9
See Sean Stonefield, The 10 Most Valuable Trademarks, FORBES (June 15, 2011), https://www.
forbes.com/sites/seanstonefield/2011/06/15/the-10-most-valuable-trademarks/#6785979236b8 [https://
perma.cc/M73Z-5GTT] (presenting the results of a brand consulting firm’s estimate of the ten most
valuable trademarks).
10
Because copyright law falls under a different regulatory mechanism than the USPTO and does
not have a disciplinary arm, it is omitted from this Article.
11
See Rebecca Tushnet, Intellectual Property as a Public Interest Mechanism, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 95, 96 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Justine Pila eds.,
2018); see also J.H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property
Rights: Reconciling Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of Information, 147 U. PA. L. REV.
875, 911 (1999) (describing the conflict between private and public interest in intellectual property).
12
Tushnet, supra note 11, at 96.
13
Id. at 103.
14
See id. at 103–04 (identifying arguments to the contrary).
15
See, e.g., Changes to Representation of Others Before the United States Patent and Trademark
Office, 78 Fed. Reg. 20,179, 20,184 (Apr. 3, 2013) (to be codified in scattered parts of 37 C.F.R.)
(“All decisions made by the [USPTO] in patent and trademark matters affect the public interest.”).
16
Daniel Nazer, Opinion, Theranos: How a Broken Patent System Sustained Its Decade-Long
Deception, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 4, 2019), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2019/03/theranos-howa-broken-patent-system-sustained-its-decade-long-deception/ [https://perma.cc/W95Q-R2Y8].
17
See Elizabeth Holmes’ Failed Theranos Was Just Granted 5 New Patents in 2019, CB INSIGHTS (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.cbinsights.com/research/theranos-patents-2019/ [https://perma.
cc/QA9Z-5NLK] (describing five patents issued after the company shut down).
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there has been a dramatic increase in the number of reported fraudulent trademark applications from China, a country from which one-ninth of U.S. trademark applications originate. 18 Addressing this phenomenon, Director Iancu
noted that without an accurate register, businesses cannot reliably use the register to determine whether marks would be available for protection. This uncertainty could in turn lead businesses to alter their strategies and increase costs. 19
The USPTO is the federal agency charged with ensuring the accurate issuance of U.S. patents and the federal registration of trademarks. In many
ways, the patent and trademark functions at the USPTO are entirely separate—
each has its own office that is responsible for examining applications, and each
has a separate board that hears appeals and other challenges. 20 That distinction
is not surprising, however, given the significant differences between the two
species of intellectual property in terms of the relevant legal doctrines, procedural requirements, and subject matter expertise involved. 21 But when it comes
to the regulation of practitioners who are authorized to practice before the
USPTO, both fall under the purview of the USPTO’s Office of Enrollment and
Discipline (OED), which is part of the Office of General Counsel. 22
It is this latter commonality that presents an opportunity to examine the
current state of professional discipline across patent and trademark practice,
along with a potential mechanism for comprehensive reform. On account of
the technical and legal expertise required in order to successively navigate the
respective application processes, patent and trademark applicants alike routinely rely on specialized practitioners to prosecute their applications. 23 All practitioners—whether patent agents, patent attorneys, or trademark attorneys—are
subject to identical USPTO Rules of Professional Conduct (USPTO Rules) that
require them to conform their practices to the ethical standards contained
therein. 24 Even though there are some differences between the OED and other

18
See Jacob Gershman, Flood of Trademark Applications from China Alarms U.S. Officials,
WALL ST. J. (May 5, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/flood-of-trademark-applications-fromchina
alarms-u-s-officials-1525521600 [https://perma.cc/3PSP-5XSY] (exemplifying the recent media attention on fraudulent trademark applications).
19
Iancu, Remarks at International Trademark Association, supra note 8.
20
See Organizational Offices, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/aboutus/organizational-offices [https://perma.cc/TZB3-84YR] (describing the organizational structure of the
USPTO).
21
See discussion infra Part I.
22
See Office of the General Counsel, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.
gov/about-us/organizational-offices/office-general-counsel [https://perma.cc/A6MX-VS5F] (stating
OED’s role as overseeing the “registration and regulation of patent attorneys and agents to practice
before the USPTO”).
23
See discussion infra Parts II.A and II.B.
24
37 C.F.R. § 11.19 (2019).
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disciplinary authorities, 25 the USPTO’s disciplinary process is styled after the
ABA Model Rules for Disciplinary Enforcement 26 and its rules are largely
modeled after the ABA Model Rules for Professional Conduct (ABA Rules). 27
So, the question arises: how does the OED compare to other state disciplinary authorities in its imposition of discipline on patent and trademark practitioners, given the unique functions of the USPTO and its corresponding concerns for those who practice before it? Surprisingly, there have been no indepth longitudinal empirical studies of professional discipline in the scholarly
literature—much less any that have touched on USPTO discipline. This Article
begins to fill that gap. It provides a comprehensive analysis of USPTO discipline spanning sixteen years (2003–2018) and crossing two sets of ethics
codes, examines the disparities between patent and trademark discipline, and
identifies the types of misconduct that are being regulated—or missed—by
USPTO authorities. It then explicitly links these findings to the purposes of
professional discipline and concludes with recommendations so that the
USPTO can realign its disciplinary work in accordance with its private and
public constituencies.
Part I describes the patent and trademark application processes, focusing
on the duty of candor and the roles of the practitioner in maximizing the likelihood of success. 28 Although theoretically litigants can navigate both systems
pro se, the systems are designed for those who have the requisite subject matter and legal expertise. 29 Indeed, the duty of candor requires the person filing
the application to understand what information must be disclosed to the
USPTO and how to respond to the inevitable USPTO inquiries and objections.
Part II outlines the regulation of USPTO practitioners, both with respect
to the requirements for admission and disciplinary investigations. 30 Although
patent practitioners need not be licensed attorneys, all must satisfy a similar set
of criteria to ensure they have the requisite competence and moral character
associated with a person who is entrusted to be both a legal representative and
a fiduciary. With the exception of reciprocal discipline, which merits special
attention for USPTO practitioners, the USPTO’s disciplinary process bears
See discussion infra Part II.C.
Compare 37 C.F.R. § 11.24 (outlining the OED’s process for imposing reciprocal discipline),
with MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENF’T r. 22 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002) (providing for
reciprocal discipline).
27
See discussion infra Part III.B (comparing and contrasting the USPTO Rules and ABA Rules).
28
See discussion infra Part I.
29
See Pro Se Assistance Program, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/
patents-getting-started/using-legal-services/pro-se-assistance-program [https://perma.cc/Y5SC-JEGG]
(explaining that individuals can file pro se but recommending the use of a registered attorney or
agent).
30
See discussion infra Part II.
25
26
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resemblance to that of a state disciplinary authority in terms of the course of
the proceedings and the possible sanctions that may be imposed.
Part III introduces the two sets of USPTO ethics codes in force at various
points during the time period under examination. 31 Although the USPTO Code
of Professional Responsibility (1985–2013) was loosely modeled after the
ABA Code of Professional Conduct, it also contained a number of specific
provisions that were exclusive to USPTO practice. On the other hand, the
USPTO Rules, adopted in 2013, largely mirror the ABA Rules. The differences
between USPTO Rules and ABA Rules highlight the ways in which the
USPTO purports to take candor seriously. The USPTO’s stance is arguably
accounted for by its view that its decisions have an impact that extends beyond
the immediate applicant, to competitors and ultimately to the public at large.
This Part concludes with the first mapping between the various sets of ethics
codes in order to facilitate a comprehensive analysis.
Part IV provides a theoretical framework for understanding practitioner
discipline in the intellectual property context. 32 Drawing on the work of several prominent ethics scholars, 33 this Part explores the primary purposes of practitioner discipline and the role of sanctions in carrying out those purposes. It
then focuses on the role of the USPTO as the regulator of the provision of valuable intellectual property rights, in order to further understand and prioritize
among the various purposes that have been identified.
Part V presents the findings of a groundbreaking empirical study of all
public discipline imposed by the USPTO between January 1, 2003, and December 31, 2018. 34 After describing the methodology used to compile the data,
this Part focuses on the frequency and types of USPTO-imposed discipline, in
comparison to its state disciplinary authority counterparts. It finds that the
USPTO disciplinary rates, though increasing slightly over the sixteen-year period under study, lag far behind state disciplinary authorities. This Part then
delves more deeply into patent and trademark practitioner discipline, finding
that there are vast discrepancies between the two. Although it appears that the
imposition of both patent and trademark discipline is primarily limited to the
types of misconduct that are easily identified and ultimately have less impact
on the public interest, patent practitioners are disciplined more frequently,
more severely, and more publicly than their trademark counterparts. This Part
also identifies and describes four commonly observed patterns of misconduct
See discussion infra Part III.
See discussion infra Part IV.
33
See generally Fred C. Zacharias, The Purposes of Lawyer Discipline, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV.
675 (2003) (presenting various theories on the purposes of lawyer discipline and the impact of adopting such theories on various constituents).
34
See discussion infra Part V.
31
32
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that trigger discipline across commonly cited and highly correlated ethics
rules.
Finally, Part VI sets forth three recommendations for future legal and procedural reforms to improve the effectiveness of USPTO discipline in fulfilling its
role. 35 These recommendations include developing a trademark practitioner registration process to facilitate the monitoring of their work and communications;
instituting a strategic practitioner audit program that includes extensive examiner
input; and broadening the dissemination of information on USPTO discipline
and expectations of its practitioners. Part VI concludes and offers thoughts on
additional ways in which this empirical work can be leveraged and implemented.
I. PATENT AND TRADEMARK PROSECUTION
It is not easy to navigate the required steps to obtain a patent or register a
trademark (collectively referred to as “prosecution”). Even if an application contains the required components, there are still many legal and procedural hurdles
awaiting the unsuspecting inventor or brand manager. 36 It is for that reason and
others that the majority of applicants choose to leverage the expertise of a patent
or trademark practitioner—which increases the likelihood that they will successfully receive federal protection of their intellectual property. This Part identifies
the primary hurdles and describes the duty of candor that runs throughout all
interactions with the USPTO during the application process and beyond.
A. Patent Application Process
To be granted a patent, which gives the patent holder the right to exclude
others from practicing a patented invention, the patent claims must adequately
notify the public of the invention’s scope. 37 The patent statute requires that the
invention consist of eligible subject matter 38 that is sufficiently disclosed in the
patent application. 39 Additionally, the invention must be novel (i.e. not previously known or used by others), 40 useful, and non-obvious to one who is
See discussion infra Part VI.
See discussion infra Part I.A.
37
Cf. Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 341 F.3d 1332, 1332, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(holding patent disclosing a process to make polyethylene terephthalate (PET) yarn, used as reinforcement for automobile tires, was indefinite and thus invalid).
38
See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a
patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”).
39
See id. § 112(a)–(b) (describing the requirements for the specification of a patentable invention).
40
See id. § 102(a)(1) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . the claimed invention was
patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the
35
36
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skilled in the relevant field. 41 If these criteria are met, a patent may be awarded
to the applicant as long as other administrative requirements are satisfied.
Patent applications may be filed by mail or, more commonly, online. 42
The application must include a written description and the claim(s) that describe the scope of the protection that will be afforded by the patent. 43 In addition, the application must include the inventor’s name along with an oath or
declaration that the inventor believes that he or she is the original inventor or
joint inventor of a claimed invention contained in the application. 44 Although
not required at the time the application is filed, an Information Disclosure
Statement (IDS) must be submitted by the applicant in a timely fashion. 45 The
IDS must contain information about all known prior art, i.e. information that
suggests that the invention may not be original, and other information that is
material in determining patentability. 46 Further discussion of this obligation,
known as the duty of disclosure, will follow in the next Section.
The filing of the application is only the beginning of a lengthy and involved patent prosecution process. Once submitted to the USPTO, the application will be assigned to a patent examiner based on the technical field of the
patent. 47 The examiner will evaluate the application and issue one or more office actions containing grounds of objection or rejection. 48 An applicant must
public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention . . . .”). This section contains several
exceptions that are not relevant to this Article. See id. § 102(b).
41
Id. § 103. The statute notes:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the
claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole
would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a
person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains.
Id.

42
See File Online, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/patentsapplication-process/file-online [https://perma.cc/G3PE-XCS3] (explaining the types of online filing
through EFS-Web, an electronic filing system, and postal mail).
43
35 U.S.C. § 111.
44
Id. § 115.
45
37 C.F.R. § 1.97 (2019). The filing of the IDS has been a bottleneck for patent pendency, which
has spurred the USPTO to develop programs to expedite the process. See Quick Path Information Disclosure Statement, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/patent/initiatives/quickpath-information-disclosure-statement-qpids [https://perma.cc/B5UP-FDFF] (describing the Quick
Path Information Disclosure Statement).
46
See 37 C.F.R. § 1.97–.98.
47
See Stephen Key, A Former Patent Examiner Pulls Back the Curtain at the USPTO, INC. (Dec.
11, 2015), https://www.inc.com/stephen-key/a-former-patent-examiner-pulls-back-the-curtain-at-theuspto.html [https://perma.cc/5CRX-DPRD] (providing an interview with a former USPTO examiner
about his work).
48
Michael Best & Friedrich LLP, Abandonment and Revival of U.S. Patent Application, NAT’L L.
REV. (Oct. 27, 2012), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/abandonment-and-revival-us-patentapplication [https://perma.cc/RS9K-65PR].
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submit an acceptable, timely response or else the application will be deemed
abandoned. 49 An abandoned patent application can only be reinstated in limited
circumstances; otherwise, the applicant may lose all claims to the nowdisclosed invention. 50
Once a patent is granted, the holder receives exclusive rights to the disclosed invention for twenty years from the date of filing provided that maintenance fees are paid during the active patent life. 51 If maintenance fees are not
paid by the stated deadline, the granted patent will be deemed abandoned. 52
Again, just as in the prosecution process, this determination is typically fatal to
the patent, and the patent holder’s rights to the disclosed invention will most
likely be lost. 53
A patent practitioner is key to successfully navigating the patent prosecution process and thereby protecting the value of an applicant’s invention. Patent applications not only must conform to the formal requirements and adequately disclose the invention with properly constructed claims, but there must
also be persuasive responses to an examiner’s findings of obviousness or lack
of novelty to avoid the final rejection of the application. 54 Although there are a
number of online resources that explain the process, these resources may provide a false sense of ability to navigate the process, proving to be a trap for one
who is inexperienced in patent prosecution because the process in fact requires
significant expertise. 55
The USPTO puts it best in its strong recommendation of securing patent
representation: “Inventors may prepare their own applications and file them in
the USPTO and conduct the proceedings themselves, but unless they are famil37 C.F.R. § 1.134–.135.
Id. § 1.137; see Abandoned Applications, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.
uspto.gov/trademarks-application-process/abandoned-applications [https://perma.cc/95ZM-Y67T]
(describing abandonment and the revival process). Note that if the abandonment occurs before the
USPTO publishes the pending application (generally eighteen months after filing), the invention may
remain a trade secret. See 35 U.S.C. § 122.
51
See Maintain Your Patent, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/
patents-maintaining-patent/maintain-your-patent [https://perma.cc/8543-AGVM] (providing details on
maintenance fees).
52
See id. (“Maintenance fees are required to keep in force all utility and reissue utility patents
. . . .”).
53
See id.
54
See Katrina Brundage & Sarah Garber, Are Patent Attorneys Worth Their Billables?, ABOVE
THE LAW (Apr. 27, 2016), http://abovethelaw.com/2016/04/are-patent-attorneys-worth-their-billables/
[https://perma.cc/JSA8-6FM5] (arguing that patent attorneys are, indeed, worth their fees).
55
See How to Conduct a U.S. Patent Search: A Step-by-Step Strategy, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/video/cbt/ptrcsearching (providing a guide to conducting a
patent search). The USPTO also has a Pro Se Assistance Program. See Pro Se Assistance Program,
supra note 29 (providing some assistance to pro se applicants but recommending the use of registered
patent practitioners).
49
50
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iar with these matters or study them in detail, they may get into considerable
difficulty.” 56 It further warns that, even if a pro se applicant were to be successful, there is no guarantee that the patent obtained would actually cover the invention the applicant intended it to. 57
The USPTO’s stance on practitioner representation is in line with the
available data on the subject. One frequently cited58 empirical study examining
applications filed by pro se inventors versus their practitioner counterparts reported that 76% of pro se applications became abandoned, in comparison to
only 35% of practitioner-represented applications. 59 Among those that were
successful in obtaining patents, the pro se claims were narrower—and thereby
less valuable—than those claims that had practitioner representation. The researcher hypothesized that the observed differences were due to the typical pro
se applicant’s lack of understanding of the formal filing requirements or the
need for timely responses, as well as the apparent lack of desire to engage in a
lengthy exchange with examiners. 60
Perhaps surprisingly, there is no precise way, based on the publicly available data, to determine the percentage of all patent applications that are filed with
practitioner assistance. 61 The USPTO, for its part, simply states that “most” inventors do so. 62 One scholar, who thoroughly examined a large sample of patent applications from 2011, found that approximately 92% were represented
by a patent practitioner. 63 To check the accuracy of the 92% estimate, this
study examined a complete patent application dataset from 2000 to 2018, 64
56
General Information Concerning Patents, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.
uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/general-information-concerning-patents#heading-9 [https://perma.
cc/u4ct-33c3].
57
Id.
58
See, e.g., Deborah R. Gerhardt & Jon P. McClanahan, Do Trademark Lawyers Matter?, 16
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 583, 591 & n.50 (2013); Peter Lee, Toward a Distributive Agenda for U.S. Patent Law, 55 HOUS. L. REV. 321, 365 (2017).
59
Kate S. Gaudry, The Lone Inventor: Low Success Rates and Common Errors Associated with
Pro-Se Patent Applications, 7 PLOS ONE e33141 (2012), https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?
id=10.1371/journal.pone.0033141&type=printable [https://perma.cc/6X8M-XKB4].
60
See id.
61
The publicly available data on attorney docket number and customer number do not exactly
track the frequency of practitioner filings. See infra notes 66–68 and accompanying text.
62
General Information Concerning Patents, supra note 56.
63
See Dennis Crouch, Estimate: Fewer Than 26,000 Active US Patent Attorneys & Agents, PATENTLY-O (Jan. 13, 2012), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2012/01/the-uspto-records-identify-morethan-41750-active-registered-practitioners-that-number-is-obviously-wrong-because-many-folk.html
[https://perma.cc/6QBC-V8HP].
64
See Patent Examination Research Dataset, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://bulk
data.uspto.gov/data/patent/pair/economics/2017/ [https://perma.cc/3VKK-HZ2G] (containing data on
all application filings). The USPTO has made much of its data available for researchers through the
Bulk Data Storage System and is a fruitful source for future research. See generally Bulk Data Storage
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focusing on the attorney docket number and customer number fields. 65 The
attorney docket number is a self-selected designation that patent prosecutors
(most likely, practitioners) may use to track their applications. 66 The customer
number is another tracking mechanism, but it is issued by the USPTO and requires the prosecutor to take the additional step of completing a form. 67 Over
this time period, 96% of the applications contained an attorney docket number,
whereas 87% included a customer number. These two values lend support to
the 92% statistic, which will be used in Part V of this Article to estimate the
percentage of applications that are filed by a patent practitioner.
B. Candor in Patent Prosecution
One of the most important roles of patent practitioners is to ensure that
proper disclosures are made to the USPTO during the application process, or
else they risk having the patent refused or later invalidated. 68 Under 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.56, “[e]ach individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent
application has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the Office,
which includes a duty to disclose to the Office all information known to that
individual to be material to patentability . . . .” 69 Patent practitioners are included among those individuals to which this duty applies. 70 The duty of disclosure rests on the principle that a patent “is affected [by the] public interest”
and that “[t]he public interest is best served” when the USPTO knows all of the
information material to patentability, including information that undercuts the
applicant’s claim. 71
System (BDSS) Version 1.1.0, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://bulkdata.uspto.gov/
[https://perma.cc/F64Z-RLTS].
65
See Crouch, supra note 63.
66
See Docket Number, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/ebc/portal/info
docketnumber.htm [https://perma.cc/S955-76T2] (defining and explaining the term “Docket Number”).
67
See Getting Started—New Users, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/
patents-application-process/applying-online/getting-started-new-users [https://perma.cc/EBD6-NPCV]
(explaining customer numbers and providing an application form to obtain a customer number from the
USPTO).
68
See, e.g., Lisa A. Dolak, Patent Office Contested Proceedings and the Duty of Candor, 22 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 3 (2014) (noting the USPTO rule that “imposes an obligation of candor and good
faith”); Dorian Ojemen, Comment, The Ethics of Inter Partes Review Before the USPTO, 47 ST.
MARY’S L.J. 645, 669 (2016) (explaining the importance of the duty of candor and good faith and
comparing Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and ABA Model Rule 3.1 and 3.3); Robert
Kalinsky, The Enhanced Duty of Candor Before the Patent Office, LAW360 (Apr. 24, 2013), https://
www.law360.com/articles/432273/the-enhanced-duty-of-candor-before-the-patent-office [https://
perma.cc/96FD-ZRSF] (“All patent applicants know of the duty of candor that is required to practice
before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.”).
69
37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2019).
70
Id.§ 1.56(c)(2).
71
Id. § 1.56(a).
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This duty of disclosure is enforced in two ways. First, as described in Part
III, the USPTO Rules mandate compliance with the duty of disclosure and subject non-compliant practitioners to discipline. 72 Second, and arguably even more
dramatic, patents in which there has been a violation of the duty of disclosure
may be rendered unenforceable through application of the inequitable conduct
doctrine. 73 Although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 2011, in
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., somewhat circumscribed the scope
of the inequitable conduct doctrine, 74 it still retains vitality today. 75
In order to show inequitable conduct, a challenger must demonstrate both
that the “applicant misrepresented or omitted material information with the
specific intent to deceive the PTO,” 76 and that the USPTO would not have “allowed the claim if it had been aware of the undisclosed reference,” applying a
“but-for” standard for materiality of the non-disclosure. 77 The materiality
prong may also be satisfied, however, where there has been “egregious misconduct,” such as the filing of a clearly false affidavit. 78 Furthermore, the Federal Circuit has recently expanded its view of how intent may be shown, allowing an inference of intent based on “a pattern of lack of candor” such as repeated factual representations that turn out to be contrary to information in the
declarant’s possession. 79

See discussion infra Part III.
See, e.g., Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int’l Ltd., 716 F. Supp. 316, 327–33 (N.D. Ill.
1989) (finding inequitable conduct in the prosecution of one claim that resulted in the rejection of
related patent applications). See generally Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Patent Law’s
Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 735 (2011) (providing a comprehensive discussion of
the inequitable conduct doctrine).
74
649 F.3d 1276, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc). There have been several articles on the impact
of Therasense, Inc. on findings of inequitable conduct. See generally Robert D. Swanson, Comment,
The Exergen and Therasense Effects, 66 STAN. L. REV. 695 (2014) (adding data to the debate over
Therasense, Inc.).
75
See, e.g., Regeneron Pharm., Inc. v. Merus N.V., 864 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (affirming the lower court finding of inequitable conduct on the part of Regeneron that rendered its patent
unenforceable).
76
Therasense, Inc., 649 F.3d at 1287.
77
Id. at 1291; see Amy Semet, Specialized Trial Courts in Patent Litigation: A Review of the
Patent Pilot Program’s Impact on Appellate Reversal Rates at the Five-Year Mark, 60 B.C. L. REV.
519, 524 (2019) (noting that inequitable conduct arises and a patent is found unenforceable when the
patent prosecutor commits fraud in the patent prosecution process).
78
Therasense, Inc., 649 F.3d at 1292.
79
Regeneron Pharm., Inc., 864 F.3d at 1351 (citing Apotex Inc. v. UCB, Inc., 763 F.3d 1354,
1362 (Fed. Cir. 2014)); see Alison McGreary & Ryan Cagle, Federal Circuit Says Inequitable Conduct Can Be Inferred from Activities in a Later Patent Litigation?, IPWATCHDOG (Oct. 13, 2017),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/10/13/federal-circuit-inequitable-conduct-inferred-later-patentlitigation/id=88978/ [https://perma.cc/9HJH-VSK5] (discussing the Regeneron Pharm., Inc. decision
and opining whether OED discipline might follow for the patent prosecutor).
72
73
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In addition to the duty of candor in patent prosecution, there are also obligations of candor and good faith in post-grant proceedings, similar to those
codified in Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 80 In 2016, these
provisions were amended to add that filings must comply with 37 C.F.R.
§ 11.18(b) that requires that the declarant certify the truth of all statements that
are made within his or her own knowledge. The regulation further requires the
declarant to certify, to the best of her knowledge, that there is evidentiary support, and that there is a bona fide legal basis for her arguments. 81
At the time of these amendments, some were concerned that the additional certifications went beyond those in the patent prosecution process and would
lead to additional disciplinary proceedings against practitioners. 82 In its response, the USPTO noted that there had not been many investigations prior to
the amendment and that it “d[id] not expect this situation to occur.” 83 Nevertheless, 37 C.F.R. § 11.18(d) explicitly provides that a practitioner who violates § 11.18 may face disciplinary action. 84
C. Trademark Application Process
A trademark may be registered either in a particular state or nationally
through the USPTO. Although federal registration is not required to enforce a
trademark through an infringement action—and indeed, trademarks may be
enforced without being registered at all—federal registration has several strategic advantages. First, it constitutes prima facie evidence that the mark is valid and owned by the registrant. 85 Second, it allows a registrant to secure nationwide exclusive rights rather than just in those geographic locations where
the mark is currently used. 86 Third, it puts all others on notice of the regis37 C.F.R. § 42.11 (2019); Dolak, supra note 68, at 3.
37 C.F.R. § 11.18(b).
82
Amendments to the Rules of Practice for Trials Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 81
Fed. Reg. 18,750, 18,760 (Apr. 1, 2016) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42) (providing comments on
proposed changes prior to adoption); David Hricik, Revision to IPR Duty of Candor: Broadening
Duty?, PATENTLY-O (Apr. 1, 2016), https://patentlyo.com/hricik/2016/04/proposed-revision-broadening.
html [https://perma.cc/U8WR-DSJG].
83
Amendments to the Rules of Practice for Trials Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 81
Fed. Reg. at 18,760.
84
37 C.F.R. § 11.18(d).
85
15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (2018).
86
Compare Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 365, 369 (2d Cir. 1959)
(denying injunctive relief after finding no likelihood of confusion but clarifying that “the plaintiff may
later, upon a proper showing of an intent to use the mark at the retail level in defendant’s market area,
be entitled to enjoin defendant’s use of the mark”), with United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co.,
248 U.S. 90, 101, 104 (1918) (estopping the plaintiff from seeking an injunction to prevent the defendant from continuing to use a similar mark in a geographic location where the plaintiff had no
business).
80
81
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trant’s claim of ownership of the mark. 87 Trademark applications and registrations may be searched online through the USPTO website, 88 and the existence
of a registered mark can serve as an effective deterrent to organizations searching to create a distinctive brand. 89
In comparison to patent prosecution, obtaining a federal registration appears to be a simple process. The application forms are available online and are
expected to take less than an hour to complete. 90 The application requests information on the owner of the proposed mark, identification of the goods or
services the applicant uses or intends to use in connection with the mark, the
date on which the mark was first used in interstate commerce, and whether an
attorney is filing the application. 91 A specimen illustrating the mark as used
must also be submitted prior to registration, either with the application (if
claiming that it is currently being used in commerce) or after publication (if
claiming an intent to use the mark in commerce). 92
After a trademark application is submitted, there are two barriers to registration. First, the USPTO will assign an examining attorney to review the application and potentially refuse registration. 93 The most common grounds for
refusal are likelihood of confusion (that consumers may confuse the proposed
mark with another business) 94 and descriptiveness (that consumers do not view
the symbol as a distinctive mark). 95 If the examining attorney finds a defect in
87
See 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (“[T]he filing of the application to register such mark shall constitute
constructive use of the mark, conferring a right of priority, nationwide in effect, on or in connection
with the goods or services specified in the registration . . . .”).
88
Search Trademark Database, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/trade
marks-application-process/search-trademark-database [https://perma.cc/4WC4-RSD4]; see TESS TIPS,
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/process/search/Tess_tips.jsp
[https://perma.cc/BKD9-47X8] (explaining how to use the Trademark Electronic Search System
(TESS) to determine whether a proposed mark could be subject to refusal due to the existence of a
prior application or registration).
89
Gerhardt & McClanahan, supra note 58, at 587.
90
See Apply Online, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/teas/
index.jsp [https://perma.cc/GQJ2-95KS].
91
15 U.S.C. § 1051.
92
Id.
93
See Stuart J.H. Graham et al., The USPTO Trademark Case Files Dataset: Descriptions, Lessons, and Insights, 22 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 669, 677 (2013) (describing and examining
several aspects of the trademark application data).
94
See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (providing that a mark may not be registered if it “so resembles a
mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, or a mark or trade name previously used in the
United States by another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the
goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive”).
95
See id. § 1052(e)–(f) (providing that a mark may not be registered if the mark “when used on or
in connection with the goods of the applicant is merely descriptive” or “is primarily geographically
deceptively misdescriptive of [the applicant’s goods]” unless the mark “has become distinctive of the
applicant’s goods in commerce”).
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the trademark application or otherwise believes that it may not be suitable for
registration, the examiner may issue an office action identifying the problem. 96
In response, the applicant—or more often, the attorney on behalf of the applicant—may amend the application to fix the defect or submit additional materials to demonstrate that it should register. If the examining attorney approves
the application, the mark is published in the Official Gazette, a USPTO weekly
publication. 97
After publication, third-parties who believe they have legal grounds to
oppose the registration have thirty days to prevent the impending registration by
filing an opposition proceeding. 98 If no opposition is filed, or if there is an opposition and the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) sides with the applicant, the application will proceed to the next step in the process. Marks already
being used in commerce will be placed on the Principal Register immediately,
whereas those filed on an intent to use basis will register once the applicant provides evidence that he or she has begun using the mark in commerce. 99
Although the trademark registration process may be accomplished without legal counsel, over three-quarters of all applications are prosecuted by attorneys. 100 Moreover, having a trademark attorney is correlated with higher
rates of publication and registration success. A comprehensive empirical study
on trademark applications found that trademark applicants were 37% more
likely to succeed in publication and 43% more likely to succeed in registration
than their pro se counterparts. 101 Among trademark attorneys, experience prosecuting trademark applications was correlated with even higher success rates—
a significant finding given that those attorneys likely take on more challenging
cases. 102
There are a number of reasons posited for the higher trademark attorney
success rates. First, attorneys have a greater understanding of the underlying
trademark doctrine and can draft responses to avoid legal landmines. 103 Second, they may be less conflict-averse than their pro se counterparts, choosing
to respond to an examining attorney’s objection rather than abandoning the
application at the first sign of trouble. 104 Third, their higher success rates might
reflect selectivity in which applications to prosecute, as they may be counsel96
Trademark Process, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/
process/ [https://perma.cc/M5PF-ME29].
97
Id.
98
15 U.S.C. § 1063(a).
99
Id. § 1051.
100
See Gerhardt & McClanahan, supra note 58, at 600.
101
Id. at 607–08.
102
Id. at 611, 617.
103
Id. at 597, 617.
104
See id. at 617–18.
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ing their clients at the outset that they will be unable to register a descriptive
mark and thus should avoid the time and expense related to filing. 105
The USPTO, for its part, has gone back and forth on the degree to which it
encourages pro se applications. At the turn of the twenty-first century, the
USPTO made several changes to make it easier to file applications and included
more information online to assist non-attorneys who wished to file. 106 More recently the USPTO website is emphasizing the advantages of attorney assistance
in filing trademark applications,107 perhaps in recognition of the disparity in success rates and other anecdotal evidence of the benefits of legal representation.
D. Candor in Trademark Prosecution
As compared to patent prosecution, scholars and intellectual property attorneys pay significantly less attention to the duty of candor in trademark prosecution. 108 The phrases “duty of disclosure” and “inequitable conduct” are
ubiquitous in the patent literature, and nearly every practitioner knows of Therasense, Inc. and its progeny. 109 But as described below, similar concepts are
carried into trademark practice and arguably should have similar force. 110
At the end of the federal trademark application form, there are a number
of statements that must be acknowledged and signed. 111 These statements include that “[t]he signatory believes that the applicant is the owner of the
trademark/service mark sought to be registered,” that the mark is either being
used in commerce or that the applicant has a bona fide intention to do so, and
that the facts set forth in the application are true. 112 Furthermore, the signatory
must acknowledge that “[t]o the best of the signatory’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,
Id. at 592.
See, e.g., Trademark FAQs, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/
learning-and-resources/trademark-faqs [https://perma.cc/B7ZH-G528]; Trademark Information Network,
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks-getting-started/process-overview/
trademark-information-network [https://perma.cc/7EBG-HWYX].
107
See Hiring a U.S.-Licensed Attorney, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.
uspto.gov/trademarks-getting-started/why-hire-private-trademark-attorney [https://perma.cc/DCV8726X] (explaining the advantages of legal representation in trademark prosecution).
108
But see Linda K. McLeod & Stephanie H. Bald, Ethical Issues in U.S. Trademark Prosecution
and TTAB Practice, 10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 365, 374 (2011) (discussing ethical duties of trademark practitioners, including the duty of candor).
109
See, e.g., Ojemen, supra note 68, at 669 (discussing the duty of candor and the doctrine of
inequitable conduct).
110
See McLeod & Bald, supra note 108, at 374.
111
For a PDF version of the application, including the statements that must be signed by the applicant, see Trademark/Service Mark Application, Principle Register, https://www.uspto.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/TEAS_Plus.pdf [https://perma.cc/SW7U-EWNT].
112
Id.
105
106
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the allegations and other factual contentions made [in the submitted application] have evidentiary support.” 113 The acknowledgements conclude with a
warning that “willful false statements” could “jeopardize the validity of the
application or submission or any registration resulting therefrom” or may lead
to criminal prosecution. 114
Although rare, the TTAB has invalidated federal trademark registration
where there is clear and convincing evidence that the applicant committed
fraud in the procurement of the registration. 115 Such fraud may occur by,
among other things, fabricating specimens in support of applications or by
making false statements related to the use of the mark in commerce. 116 Persons
committing such fraud are also liable for damages to those who have been
harmed. 117 Although the leading trademark fraud case, In re Bose Corp.,
seemed to heighten the standard for proving fraud from a showing of negligence to evidence of an intent to deceive, 118 the Federal Circuit left open the
question of whether fraud could also be found based on a high degree of recklessness. 119 Indeed, In re Bose Corp. and Therasense, Inc. espouse very similar
views as they relate to misrepresentations made to the USPTO, yet only the
latter has endured in the practitioner lexicon.

113

Id.
Id.
115
See, e.g., Nationstar Mortg. LLC v. Ahmad, 112 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1361, 1376 (T.T.A.B.
2014) (invalidating use of “Nationstar” in connection with real estate business when it was clear
that applicant had not been using the trademark in commerce).
116
See id.; see also Sarah Bro, Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Sustains Opposition on the
Basis of Fraud, JD SUPRA (Nov. 21, 2014), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/trademark-trial-andappeal-board-sustain-82527/ [https://perma.cc/8HE3-SHC9] (discussing Nationstar Mortgage LLC
and its import).
117
15 U.S.C. § 1120.
118
See 580 F.3d 1240, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[W]e hold that a trademark is obtained fraudulently under the Lanham Act only if the applicant or registrant knowingly makes a false, material representation with the intent to deceive the PTO.”). In re Bose overruled Medinol Ltd. v. Neuro Vasx, Inc.,
which had applied an objective standard for determining whether an applicant acted knowingly. See
generally Medinol Ltd. v. Neuro Vasx, Inc., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1205 (T.T.A.B. 2003); Brandon L.
Harrell, Note, Federal Circuit Tightens Standard for Proving Intent to Deceive in Trademark Fraud
Cases: In re Bose Corp., 12 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 313 (2009) (analyzing the In re Bose
Corp. decision and its impact on fraud determinations).
119
See In re Bose Corp., 580 F.3d at 1246 n.2 (“The PTO argues that under Torres, making a
submission to the PTO with reckless disregard of its truth or falsity satisfies the intent to deceive requirement. We need not resolve this issue here.”); see also Theodore H. Davis Jr. & Lauren Brenner,
Allegations of Fraudulent Procurement and Maintenance of Federal Registrations Since In re Bose
Corp., 104 TRADEMARK REP. 933, 936–43 (2014) (describing the various tests used for determining
fraud following In re Bose Corp.).
114
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II. REGULATION OF USPTO PRACTITIONERS
Although most attorneys are familiar with the general workings of state bar
admissions and discipline, the USPTO’s system operates somewhat differently.
In fact, the USPTO is one of the few federal agencies to which Congress has
given explicit authority to regulate the admissions and ethical conduct of those
persons who practice before it. 120 The USPTO established the OED in 1985 and
administers both functions through it. 121 This Part will describe the regulation of
practitioners before the USPTO. It will begin by identifying the requirements for
admission to practice that differ significantly between patent and trademark
practitioners. 122 It will then turn to a brief discussion of the OED’s disciplinary
process, highlighting the key decision points and possible outcomes. 123
A. Admission to Practice in Patent Matters
Patent law is somewhat unique in that both lawyers (patent attorneys) and
non-lawyer professionals (patent agents) are eligible to practice, provided that
those individuals meet the requirements and successfully apply for admission. 124 Other than the fact that patent attorneys must be actively licensed attorneys in good standing with a state bar, there are no other differences between patent attorneys and patent agents, either in relation to admission requirements or in the scope of permissible patent practice before the USPTO. 125
The USPTO collectively refers to both groups as “patent practitioners,” 126 and
it is for that reason that this Article uses the term “practitioner” rather than “attorney” when collectively referring to individuals who practice before the
USPTO. All patent practitioners, including patent agents, are subject to the
OED’s disciplinary authority. 127
The requirements to become a registered patent practitioner are analogous
to those for state bar admission. First, an individual must show that he or she
120
See 35 U.S.C. § 32 (2018) (giving the USPTO director the authority to discipline practitioners); Michael P. Cox, Regulation of Attorneys Practicing Before Federal Agencies, 34 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 173, 184 (1983–1984) (discussing congressional granting of authority to USPTO).
121
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PTD-10627-8-0001, OFFICE OF ENROLLMENT AND
DISCIPLINE MUST CONDUCT MORE TIMELY INVESTIGATIONS OF COMPLAINTS AGAINST PRACTITIONERS, at i (1998), https://www.oig.doc.gov/OIGPublications/USPTO-PTD-10627-06-1998.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F8H5-698D].
122
See discussion infra Parts II.A and II.B.
123
See discussion infra Part II.C.
124
37 C.F.R. § 11.6(a)–(b) (2019).
125
See id.; David Hricik, Patent Agents: The Person You Are, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 261, 262
(2007).
126
Patent and Trademark Practitioners, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.
uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/patent-and-trademark-practitioners [https://perma.cc/AG7H-Q8NV].
127
See 37 C.F.R. § 11.19(a).
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“[p]ossesses the legal, scientific, and technical qualifications necessary for him
or her to render applicants valuable service.” 128 Ordinarily, an individual will
demonstrate these qualifications through receipt of a bachelor’s degree in a
recognized scientific or technical field or a bachelor’s degree in another field
along with a specified number of credit hours in a scientific or technical
field. 129 This requirement is analogous to that of most state bars, which require
the successful completion of a Juris Doctorate degree, often from an ABAaccredited law school. 130 Second, an individual must show that he or she is
“competent to advise and assist patent applicants in the presentation and prosecution of their applications before the Office.” 131 This is generally accomplished by achieving a passing score on the patent registration examination,
akin to passing a bar admission test. 132 Third, an individual must show that he
or she “possesses good moral character and reputation.” 133 Ultimately, the
OED Director makes a determination of an individual’s moral character and
reputation pursuant to a character and fitness inquiry, similar to that which
would be conducted by a state bar. 134
Once a practitioner meets these requirements, he or she is assigned a
unique registration number and added to the USPTO’s register of attorneys and
agents. As of April 8, 2020, there were 48,000 active patent practitioners:
12,385 active patent agents and 35,615 active patent attorneys. 135
B. Admission to Practice in Trademark Matters
In contrast to patent practice, the requirements to practice before the
USPTO in trademark matters are much more streamlined. With very limited
exceptions, only active licensed attorneys in good standing with a state bar

Id. § 11.7(a)(2)(ii).
OFFICE OF ENROLLMENT & DISCIPLINE, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, GENERAL
REQUIREMENTS BULLETIN FOR ADMISSION TO THE EXAMINATION FOR REGISTRATION TO PRACTICE
IN PATENT CASES BEFORE THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, at 4–6 (2020),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/OED_GRB.pdf [https://perma.cc/2FKK-MUNK].
130
See, e.g., Rules for Admission to the Bar, MINN. ST. BD. L. EXAMINERS, https://www.ble.
mn.gov/rules/ [https://perma.cc/9MPF-5H9A] (requiring graduation from an ABA-accredited JD
program).
131
37 C.F.R. § 11.7(a)(2)(iii).
132
See OFFICE OF ENROLLMENT & DISCIPLINE, supra note 129, at 20.
133
37 C.F.R. § 11.7(a)(2)(i).
134
See, e.g., Character and Fitness Requirements, MINN. ST. BD. L. EXAMINERS, https://www.
ble.mn.gov/character-and-fitness-requirements/ [https://perma.cc/MD2Y-9CS5] (identifying the character and fitness requirements for the Minnesota bar and providing resources for applicants).
135
Practitioner Roster, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://oedci.uspto.gov/OEDCI/
practitionerRoster [https://perma.cc/3G3Q-XQQZ]. The OED continually updates these numbers,
which makes it difficult to have a comprehensive historical understanding of active practitioners. Id.
128
129
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may represent others in trademark matters before the USPTO. 136 Notably, nonlawyer patent agents generally are not eligible to practice trademark law before
the USPTO. 137
Perhaps because the USPTO does not impose additional substantive requirements on those individuals who wish to represent others in trademark
matters, it does not require an attorney to apply for recognition to practice before the USPTO nor does it assign that person a registration number when
prosecuting trademark applications on behalf of a client. For these reasons, it is
difficult to ascertain the number of “active” trademark practitioners because an
attorney might prosecute a single application on behalf of a client and thereafter
not do so again. The USPTO first learns of the involvement of a trademark
attorney when an application is filed because the application asks whether an
attorney is filing it. 138 If the question is answered in the affirmative, the
USPTO asks for basic contact information and will then communicate solely
with the listed attorney regarding the application. 139
C. OED Disciplinary Process
The OED disciplinary process may be triggered whenever the OED Director receives information that warrants an investigation. 140 That information
can come from a variety of sources, including “a client, an examiner, or another member of the USPTO, through published decisions and news articles, or
opposing counsel during an inter partes proceeding.” 141 At that time, the practitioner will be notified that an investigation has begun. 142 The OED then conducts a preliminary screening of the alleged violation that will often involve
sending a request for information (RFI) to the practitioner. 143 The practitioner
is required, pursuant to the USPTO Rules, to respond accurately and completely to the RFI or face additional ethics charges. 144
There are four possible outcomes of an investigation. First, the OED Director may close the investigation without further action, presumably because

37 C.F.R. § 11.14(a).
Id. § 11.14(b). There is a limited exception for non-attorneys who were permitted to prosecute
trademarks prior to 1957, but that class of individuals is likely very small. Id.
138
Trademark Basics, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/trademarksgetting-started/trademark-basics [https://perma.cc/N4VK-E2PY].
139
Id.
140
37 C.F.R. § 11.22(a).
141
DAVID HRICIK & MERCEDES MEYER, PATENT ETHICS: PROSECUTION § 1.03 (Matthew Bender ed., 2016).
142
37 C.F.R. § 11.22(e).
143
Id. § 11.22(f)(1)(ii).
144
Id.; HRICIK & MEYER, supra note 141, § 1.03.
136
137
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there are no grounds to proceed. 145 Second, a warning letter may be issued to
the practitioner. A warning is not public and not considered a disciplinary sanction, but it reminds practitioners of their duties under the USPTO Rules. 146
Third, the OED Director and practitioner may enter into a settlement agreement. Settlement agreements are a common method of disposition, 147 particularly for practitioners who wish to maintain an uninterrupted practice before
the USPTO. 148 Fourth, the OED Director may find that there has been a violation of the Rules and convene the Committee on Discipline (COD), a threemember panel appointed by the USPTO Director. 149 The COD will then independently determine whether there is probable cause to proceed in the disciplinary matter and make a recommendation to the OED Director. 150
Formal disciplinary hearings are conducted by an administrative law
judge, who serves as the hearing officer for the proceeding. 151 Assuming that
the complaint is not dismissed, there are four possible sanctions that may be
imposed: (1) exclusion from practice, (2) suspension, (3) public reprimand, or
(4) probation. 152 The first three sanctions, however, are mutually exclusive:
“[p]robation may be imposed in lieu of or in addition to any other disciplinary
sanction.” 153 In determining the appropriate sanction, a hearing officer is required to consider the following factors:
(1) Whether the practitioner has violated a duty owed to a client, to
the public, to the legal system, or to the profession; (2) [w]hether the
practitioner acted intentionally, knowingly, or negligently; (3) [t]he
amount of actual or potential injury caused by the practitioner’s
misconduct; and (4) [t]he existence of any aggravating or mitigating
factors. 154
See 37 C.F.R. § 11.22(h)(1).
See id. § 11.22(h)(2); Presentation at 12th Annual Advanced Patent Law Institute, U.S. Patent
& Trademark Office, Select OED Procedure, Statistics, and Case Law, at 3–4 (Mar. 10, 2017) [hereinafter USPTO Presentation], https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Advanced_Patent_
Law_Institute_2017_Slides.pdf [https://perma.cc/WS2Y-79W4] (describing warning letters and presenting statistics on their issuance).
147
Of the 410 public disciplinary actions between 2003 and 2018, 206 (50.2%) involved a settlement agreement.
148
See 37 C.F.R. § 11.22(h)(4); see, e.g., In re Guth, No. D2010-37, at 6 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Feb. 11, 2011) (final order) (using cooperation with OED and related reconciliation as a
mitigating factor).
149
37 C.F.R. §§ 11.22(h)(3), 11.23(a).
150
Id. § 11.23(b).
151
See id. § 11.39 (referencing regulation authorizing appointment of administrative law judge to
serve as hearing officer).
152
Id. § 11.20(a).
153
Id. § 11.20(a)(4).
154
Id. § 11.54(b).
145
146
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A disciplined practitioner has the right to appeal the initial decision first
to the OED Director, and subsequently to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. 155
Special attention must be paid to the imposition of reciprocal discipline at
the USPTO, given its prevalence and the differences in how discipline is imposed in such cases. Lawyers who practice before the USPTO have an affirmative obligation to notify the OED Director when they have been disciplined by
another jurisdiction or federal agency. 156 But even if they fail to do so, the
OED itself proactively searches state lawyer disciplinary records and identifies
anyone within its purview who has been disciplined. 157 In either case, the OED
director will file a complaint with the USPTO Director, without COD involvement, based on the other discipline. 158 Even though a practitioner is requested to respond to the complaint, there are extremely limited grounds on
which the practitioner may challenge the imposition of an identical sanction by
the USPTO. 159 Indeed, the USPTO Director has a reputation for successfully
rebuffing challenges to reciprocal discipline 160 that rarely go beyond consideration of the documentary record. 161
Once any type of public discipline has been imposed, the OED Director
will issue a final decision. 162 That final decision is publicly available on the
OED Reading Room website, which can be accessed by conducting a search of
the practitioner’s name, or by using the free text search feature. 163 Information
35 U.S.C. § 32.
37 C.F.R. § 11.24.
157
HRICIK & MEYER, supra note 141.
158
See 37 C.F.R. § 11.24(a).
159
See id. § 11.24(d)(1)(i)–(iv). Acceptable challenges to reciprocal discipline include:
155
156

(i) The procedure elsewhere was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to
constitute a deprivation of due process; (ii) [t]here was such infirmity of proof establishing the conduct as to give rise to the clear conviction that the Office could not, consistently with its duty, accept as final the conclusion on that subject; (iii) [t]he imposition of the same public censure, public reprimand, probation, disbarment, suspension or
disciplinary disqualification by the Office would result in grave injustice; or (iv) [a]ny
argument that the practitioner was not publicly censured, publicly reprimanded, placed
on probation, disbarred, suspended or disciplinarily disqualified.
Id.

160
See Michael E. McCabe, Jr., Enter the Sandman: USPTO Unhittable in Reciprocal Discipline
Proceedings, IPWATCHDOG (Sept. 22, 2014), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/09/22/uspto-unhittable-in-reciprocal-discipline/id=51327/ [https://perma.cc/WB2K-LD9L] (discussing the USPTO’s
perfect 77-0 record in reciprocal discipline cases).
161
USPTO Presentation, supra note 146, at 8 (acknowledging the straightforward nature of its
reciprocal discipline cases).
162
37 C.F.R. § 11.56.
163
FOIA Documents, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://e-foia.uspto.gov/Foia/OED
ReadingRoom.jsp [https://perma.cc/9PTQ-Y8U5].

1636

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 61:1613

about the practitioner’s misconduct and sanction are also published in the Official Gazette. 164
III. USPTO ETHICS RULES: A PRIMER
This Article aims to empirically study the imposition of USPTO discipline between 2003 and 2018. As a preliminary matter, therefore, it is necessary to identify and understand the USPTO’s ethics rules. This is not a straightforward task. The USPTO transitioned from the Patent and Trademark Office
Code of Professional Responsibility (USPTO Code) to the USPTO Rules of
Professional Conduct (USPTO Rules) on May 3, 2013. 165 Accordingly, this
Part first describes the structure and features of the prior USPTO Code. 166 It
then turns to a discussion of the USPTO Rules, focusing on the reasons for the
transition and the key differences between the USPTO Rules and the ABA
Rules. 167 The Part continues with a proposed mapping between the USPTO
Code, USPTO Rules, and ABA Rules, which will become the basis for the
analysis presented in Part V. 168
A. The USPTO Code (1985–2013)
The USPTO Code was based on the ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility (ABA Code) 169 that was adopted in 1969 170 but replaced in
1983 by the ABA Model Rules. 171 Indeed, the ABA’s transition from the Model
Code to the Model Rules likely precipitated the creation of the USPTO Code,
because the USPTO had previously just incorporated the ABA Code by refer-

164
See, e.g., Notice of Suspension, 1455 OFF. GAZ. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE 67, 131 (2018),
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/og/2018/week41/TOC.htm [https://perma.cc/3KKX-XJ85]
(publishing a notice of suspension); Notice of Public Reprimand and Probation, 1455 OFF. GAZ. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFFICE 67, 134 (2018), https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/og/2018/week41/
TOC.htm [https://perma.cc/A8FS-UETJ] (publishing a notice of public reprimand and probation).
165
Changes to Representation of Others Before the United States Patent and Trademark Office,
78 Fed. Reg. 20,179, 20,179 (Apr. 3, 2013) (to be codified in scattered parts of 37 C.F.R.); see also
Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Updates Prof’l Conduct Rules and Registration Examination for Patent Att’ys (Apr. 3, 2013), https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/
uspto-updates-professional-conduct-rules-and-registration-examination-patent [https://perma.cc/KF2UEJVH] (announcing the adoption of the USPTO Rules).
166
See discussion infra Part III.A.
167
See discussion infra Part III.B.
168
See discussion infra Part III.C.
169
See Practice Before the Patent and Trademark Office, 50 Fed. Reg. 5,158, 5,159 (Feb. 6, 1985)
(to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pts. 1, 2, 10).
170
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980).
171
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
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ence and applied those provisions to practitioners. 172 Like the ABA Code, the
USPTO Code contained nine canons that were “statements of axiomatic
norms, expressing in general terms the standards of professional conduct expected of practitioners in their relationships with the public, with the legal system, and with the legal profession.” 173 These canons had no real disciplinary
force—indeed, there were no USPTO disciplinary orders in the years under
study that had been predicated on the violation of a canon—but they were used
as guiding principles under which the disciplinary rules were organized. 174
Although the USPTO Code was based on the ABA Code, it also included
a multitude of rules that were specific to practitioners’ work before the Office.
Indeed, the section labeled “misconduct” contained six subsections and further
listed an additional twenty categories of behavior that constituted misconduct
before the USPTO. 175 Included among these categories was 37 C.F.R.
§ 10.23(c)(3) that proscribed “[m]isappropriation of, or failure to properly or
timely remit, funds received by a practitioner or the practitioner’s firm from a
client to pay a fee which the client is required by law to pay to the [USPTO]
Office.” 176 The specific conduct identified in these categories would have otherwise violated other enacted rules (for example, the prohibition on neglecting
a legal matter), 177 but they provided clear examples of the types of misconduct
that could occur in the course of USPTO practice. 178
In a few instances, the USPTO Code was more permissive than the ABA
Code. For example, the USPTO Code carved out an exception to the general
prohibition on practitioners acquiring a proprietary interest in the subject matter of the representation, under which they were permitted to “take an interest
in the patent as part or all of his or her fee.” 179 This provision condoned a longstanding practice between patent applicants and practitioners, analogous to a
contingency fee that lawyers had traditionally been permitted to collect. 180

172
See Practice Before the Patent and Trademark Office, 50 Fed. Reg. at 5,158 (describing the
adoption of the USPTO Code).
173
Id. at 5,175.
174
See id.
175
37 C.F.R § 10.23(b)–(c) (2012) (repealed 2013).
176
Id. § 10.23(c).
177
See id. § 10.77(c) (proscribing “[n]eglect[ing] a legal matter entrusted to the practitioner”).
178
See, e.g., id. § 10.23(c)(15) (prohibiting the act of “making a scandalous or indecent statement
in a paper filed in the [USPTO] Office”).
179
Id. § 10.64(a)(3).
180
See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-20 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980) (“Contingent
fee arrangements in civil cases have long been commonly accepted in the United States in proceedings
to enforce claims.”).

1638

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 61:1613

The USPTO Code was clear that it did not preempt the authority of states
to regulate attorneys who practiced before them. 181 What this meant for attorneys, at least, was that they were subject to at least two disciplinary authorities—
the state disciplinary authority and the OED—each potentially having significantly different ethics rules. Although practitioners were required to conduct
themselves according to the more restrictive standard, “sometimes the rules were
so different, it was hard to know which standard was more restrictive.” 182
B. The USPTO Rules (2013–Present)
Given the confusion surrounding the differences between the USPTO
Code and the ABA Rules, which had been adopted widely, the USPTO developed and eventually adopted a new set of ethics rules that drew heavily on the
ABA Rules. 183 In fact, the USPTO published a document on its website at the
time of the transition comparing the ABA Rules to the USPTO Rules that is a
helpful resource for attorney-practitioners who are already familiar with the
former. 184
In the Executive Summary that accompanied the new rules, the USPTO
stated that it believed that practitioners would “benefit from modernization of
the regulations governing professional conduct before the Office and harmonization of these regulations with corresponding rules adopted by bars in the
States and the District of Columbia.” 185 Although licensed attorneys still must
adhere to two sets of rules—and may be subject to reciprocal discipline if they
are disciplined in another state 186—the new USPTO Rules were intended to

181

notes:

Practice Before the Patent and Trademark Office, 50 Fed. Reg. at 5,158. The Federal Register

In issuing these rules, the PTO has made every effort to minimize preemption of State
control over the practice of law. Thus, in § 10.1, second sentence, the new rules provide: Nothing in * * * [these rules] shall be construed to preempt the authority of each
State to maintain control over the practice of law, except to the extent necessary for the
Patent and Trademark Office to accomplish its federal objectives.
Id. (alterations in original).
182
Steven Seidenberg, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Adopts Ethics Guidelines That Closely
Follow the ABA Model Rules, ABA J. (July 1, 2013), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/
u.s._patent_and_trademark_office_adopts_ethics_guidelines_that_closely_foll/ [https://perma.cc/
KQ3H-YDGC] (quoting Professor Lisa A. Dolak of Syracuse University College of Law).
183
Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, supra note 165.
184
US. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, ABA AND USPTO RULE COMPARISON CHART [hereinafter RULE COMPARISON CHART], https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/AbavsUSPTO.
pdf [https://perma.cc/CDT6-EJE8].
185
Changes to Representation of Others Before the United States Patent and Trademark Office,
78 Fed. Reg. at 20,180.
186
See 37 C.F.R. §§ 11.24, 11.804(h) (2019).
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“clarify[] and streamline[] their professional responsibility obligations.”187 The
USPTO also anticipated that practitioners would benefit from disciplinary actions and judicial opinions from states that had adopted the ABA Model Rules,
although it contemplated that eventually precedent specifically addressing
practice before the USPTO would develop after the USPTO rules were implemented. 188
Given that the USPTO Rules were explicitly modeled after the ABA
Rules, it raises the question of how—and why—the USPTO Rules diverge
from the ABA Rules. One would expect there to be significant inertia around
maintaining consistency between the two codes, meaning that changes would
only be made on account of the unique features of USPTO practice or its priorities in regulating practitioners.
After a thorough review of both sets of codes, this Article identifies four
primary categories of divergences. Each category is described below, together
with relevant examples and commentary on the likely reasons for the divergence.
1. Practice Differences
The USPTO Rules contain a number of semantic changes that reflect the
practice setting and the fact that those who practice before the USPTO are not
necessarily attorneys. For example, USPTO Rules 11.102 189 and 11.105 (modeled after ABA Rules 1.2 and 1.5, respectively) 190 eliminated references to conduct in criminal or domestic relations matters, because those issues should not
arise in patent or trademark litigation. 191 Whereas ABA Rule 7.4 contains general guidance on the way in which attorneys may hold themselves out to the public, USPTO Rule 11.704 contains detailed information on who may hold themselves out as patent agents and patent attorneys, as well as additional limits on
non-lawyers holding themselves out as authorized to practice trademark law. 192

187
Changes to Representation of Others Before the United States Patent and Trademark Office,
78 Fed. Reg. at 20,180.
188
Id.
189
Although the official citation to the USPTO Rules would be 37 C.F.R. § 11.XXX, this Article
will hereinafter refer to the USPTO Rules in the following manner in the main text: USPTO Rule
11.XXX.
190
RULE COMPARISON CHART, supra note 184, at 4–5, 6–8.
191
Changes to Representation of Others Before the United States Patent and Trademark Office,
78 Fed. Reg. at 20,180.
192
RULE COMPARISON CHART, supra note 184, at 53–54. For another example, USPTO Rule
11.101, which governs competence representation, added “scientific” and “technical” knowledge to
the legal knowledge required. Id.
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2. Harmonizing Provisions
Several USPTO provisions were crafted to further align the USPTO Rules
with obligations under state ethics rules or other ABA guidance. For example,
USPTO Rule 11.115, which governs accounting and recordkeeping, provides
that lawyers will be deemed in compliance with the Rule if they otherwise
meet the corresponding requirements for the state in which they are actively
licensed. The Rule further provides that non-lawyer practitioners will be
deemed in compliance if they are part of a firm that maintains records that
meet the requirements in a state in which one of their practitioners is a licensed
attorney.193 These rules have the effects of reducing confusion and streamlining
compliance, which were two goals of adopting the USPTO Rules. 194
3. Non-Adoption of Ancillary Rules
The USPTO declined to adopt a number of rules that this Article is terming “ancillary,” meaning that they are not generally the subject of disciplinary
proceedings because they are (1) explanatory, (2) aspirational, or (3) uncommon occurrences. An example of an explanatory provision is ABA Rule 1.2(b),
which provides that legal representation “does not constitute an endorsement
of the client’s political, economic, social or moral activities.” 195 ABA Rule 6.1
is an aspirational provision, encouraging lawyers to provide at least fifty hours
of pro bono service annually. 196 Two examples of uncommon occurrences include ABA Rule 1.8(j), which regulates sexual relations with clients, and ABA
Rule 7.6, which proscribes political contributions for obtaining legal engagements or appointments. 197 Even though these provisions were not formally
adopted, the USPTO clarified that lawyer-practitioners would nevertheless be
subject to these ancillary rules if they practiced in a jurisdiction that had adopted them, and that such conduct could very well violate one or more provisions
of USPTO Rule 11.804, the general misconduct section. 198
193

Id.
See Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, supra note 165.
195
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
196
Id. r. 6.1.
197
Id. r. 1.8, r. 7.6.
198
See, e.g., Changes to Representation of Others Before the United States Patent and Trademark
Office, 78 Fed. Reg. at 20,183. The Federal Register notes:
194

Section 11.108(j) is reserved. The USPTO has declined to enact a rule that specifically
addresses sexual relations between practitioners and clients. Because of the fiduciary
duty to clients, combining a professional relationship with any intimate personal relationship may raise concerns about conflict of interest and impairment of the judgment
of both practitioner and client. To the extent warranted, such conduct may be investigated under general provisions of the USPTO Rules. See § 11.804.
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4. Substantive Deviations
The USPTO Rules contain several substantive deviations from the ABA
Rules. Unlike the three preceding categories, each of these substantive deviations reflects a policy decision made by the USPTO to regulate practitioner
conduct in a different manner than the ABA Rules would provide. These deviations could potentially have a significant impact on practitioner conduct, as
well as on the OED’s disciplinary function.
a. Duty of Disclosure and Inequitable Conduct
As discussed in Part II.B, patent practitioners have a duty to disclose information that is material to patentability. In addition to the threat of having a
client’s patent invalidated, a violation of the duty of disclosure may lead to
USPTO disciplinary action. USPTO Code 11.303 mandates that practitioners
“disclose to the Office information necessary to comply with applicable duty
of disclosure provisions,” which is further reiterated in subsection 11.106(c).199
Furthermore, the USPTO Rules make it clear that a practitioner may not claim
concerns of client confidentiality as a reason for non-disclosure. Subsections
11.106(a)(2) and (a)(3) both contain confidentiality exceptions for practitioners
who reveal information to prevent or rectify injury caused by a client’s inequitable conduct before the USPTO. The explanation accompanying the final rule
states that “[t]he practitioner’s responsibility to present the client’s case with
persuasive force is qualified by the practitioner’s duty of candor to the tribunal,” exhibiting a preference for the duty of candor. 200
b. Fraud
The scienter required for fraud under the USPTO Rules is lower than that
under the ABA Model Rules, as it may be satisfied by “intent to deceive or a
state of mind so reckless respecting consequences as to be the equivalent of
intent.” 201 By contrast, the ABA definition of fraud looks to state substantive
Id.

Id. at 20,184–85.
Id. at 20,185; see Kyle R. Kroll, Essay, Prosecuting Inequitable Conduct, 102 MINN. L. REV.
HEADNOTES 49, 57 (2018) (discussing the prevalence of patent fraud before the USPTO and the applicability of the duty of disclosure); Brandee N. Woolard, Note, The Resurrection of the Duty to
Inquire After Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 12 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 41, 51 (2013–
2014) (discussing the USPTO Rules in light of the Therasense, Inc. decision).
201
37 C.F.R. § 11.1 (2019) (emphasis added). “Fraud” or “fraudulent” is defined as:
199
200

conduct that involves a misrepresentation of material fact made with intent to deceive
or a state of mind so reckless respecting consequences as to be the equivalent of intent,
where there is justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation by the party deceived, induc-
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law, but also requires a showing that a lawyer has a “purpose to deceive.” 202 In
support of its position, the USPTO cited a number of patent cases in which it
had adopted the common-law definition of fraud. 203 Interestingly, the USPTO
did not identify any trademark cases that had adopted the standard (nor did it
address the question left open in In re Bose about whether recklessness could
suffice), but the fraud definition in the USPTO Rules applies with equal force
in patent and trademark matters. 204
c. Disclosure in Ex Parte Proceedings
The USPTO Rules carry a heightened duty of disclosure for ex parte proceedings, requiring practitioners under USPTO Rule 11.303 to disclose both
known legal authority and material facts that are directly adverse to their client’s position. Notably, the USPTO justifies this deviation by stating that “[a]ll
decisions made by the Office in patent and trademark matters affect the public
interest” and that many of them are made ex parte. 205
d. Misconduct
Although the USPTO’s misconduct section largely tracks the ABA version, it does contain two additional provisions of note. 206 First, it includes a
specific provision related to the imposition of reciprocal discipline. This provision provides that a practitioner (in this case, a lawyer) who is publicly disciplined by another authority will be deemed to have committed misconduct and

ing the party to act thereon, and where there is injury to the party deceived resulting
from reliance on the misrepresentation. Fraud also may be established by a purposeful
omission or failure to state a material fact, which omission or failure to state makes other statements misleading, and where the other elements of justifiable reliance and injury
are established.
Id.

202
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.0(d) (“‘Fraud’ or ‘fraudulent’ denotes conduct
that is fraudulent under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive.”).
203
Changes to Representation of Others Before the United States Patent and Trademark Office,
78 Fed. Reg. at 20,181 (citing Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Ekrich, Inc., 375 F.3d 1341, 1358
(Fed. Cir. 2004) and In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800, 807 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
204
See Stephanie H. Bald & Linda K. McLeod, Ethical Issues for Trademark Lawyers Practicing
Before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, LANDSLIDE, May–June 2013, at 33, 36 (discussing the
new fraud definition in the context of trademark practice).
205
Changes to Representation of Others Before the United States Patent and Trademark Office,
78 Fed. Reg. at 20,184; see Leonard Raykinsteen, Ethical Considerations in Intellectual Property
Law, 99 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 47, 61 (2017) (discussing the heightened obligations of
patent practitioners because the work affects the public interest).
206
See RULE COMPARISON CHART, supra note 184, at 56–57.
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thus subject to USPTO discipline as well. 207 This provision, though not included in the ABA Rules, is not a deviation from its spirit because it is included
within another ABA-approved code, the ABA Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement. 208 Its presence is worth noting, however, given the high
percentage of USPTO disciplinary actions that impose reciprocal discipline. 209
Second, the USPTO Rules contain an additional subsection that covers
“other conduct that adversely reflects on the practitioner’s fitness to practice
before the Office.” 210 This provision was carried over from the earlier USPTO
Code and is analogous to a provision of the earlier ABA Code, which proscribed “conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice
law.” 211 This provision somewhat fell out of favor, however, as challenges began to mount over the enforceability of the provision on grounds of vagueness
and overbreadth. 212 Nevertheless, several state disciplinary codes have retained
the provision despite its absence in the ABA Rules, which counsels against
putting too much weight into the USPTO’s decision to retain it. 213
e. Conflict of Interest Fee Provisions
The USPTO Rules continue to allow practitioners to acquire interests in
patents or patent applications as their fee in matters before the Office, as was
permitted under the USPTO Code. 214 Although this provision is more lenient
than under the ABA Rules, it is still subject to the other conflict of interest limitations including 11.108(a), which requires that the transaction be fair and reasonable to the client and that the client give written informed consent to its

37 C.F.R. § 11.804(h) (2019).
MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENF’T r. 22 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002) (providing for
reciprocal discipline). See generally Arthur F. Greenbaum, The Automatic Reporting of Lawyer
Misconduct to Disciplinary Authorities: Filling the Reporting Gap, 73 O HIO S T . L.J. 437
(2012).
209
See discussion infra Part V.B.
210
37 C.F.R. § 11.804(i).
211
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(6) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980).
212
See, e.g., Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Martin, 518 A.2d 1050, 1054 (Md. 1987); see also Donald T. Weckstein, Maintaining the Integrity and Competence of the Legal Profession, 48 TEX. L. REV.
267, 276 (1970) (expressing “uncertain[ty of] what conduct will be held to reflect adversely on fitness
to practice law”). But see generally Samuel J. Levine, Taking Ethics Codes Seriously: Broad Ethics
Provisions and Unenumerated Ethical Obligations in a Comparative Hermeneutic Framework, 77
TUL. L. REV. 527 (2003) (calling on scholars to reconsider their criticism of broad ethics rules, including the fitness to practice rule).
213
See, e.g., ALABAMA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2019); MASSACHUSETTS RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(h) (2019) (proscribing “any other conduct that adversely reflects on his or
her fitness to practice law”).
214
See 37 C.F.R. § 11.108(i)(3).
207
208
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terms. 215 The USPTO Rules also allow practitioners to advance costs and expenses in connection with proceedings before the Office, 216 as well as fees that
are “required to prevent or remedy an abandonment of a client’s application”
due to practitioner misconduct. 217
These lenient and flexible fee provisions appear to recognize that the
types of matters before the USPTO differ from those at the root of the concerns
behind the conflict of interest fee provisions that appear in the ABA Rules. 218
Whereas patent and trademark matters are commercial enterprises (and the
stereotypical client a sophisticated businessperson), the ABA Rules must be
designed to cover a wider range of litigation and transactional matters and client bases.
Collectively, these substantive deviations from the ABA Rules largely reflect the heightened obligation of good faith expected of practitioners in their
actions before the USPTO. For patent cases this obligation includes the socalled “duty of disclosure,” but all practitioners are expected to disclose adverse facts and law in ex parte proceedings and are subject to discipline for
highly reckless misrepresentations, irrespective of the type of proceeding. 219
C. Mapping the Various Ethics Codes
There is no definitive mapping that exists between the USPTO Code and
the USPTO Rules. This study first aimed to develop such a mapping so that
disciplinary actions could be analyzed across years. The table below presents
the first ever mapping between those two sets of ethics codes for the disciplinary rules that have been the subject of public discipline, together with the corresponding provisions of the ABA Rules and a category description.

215
See Changes to Representation of Others Before the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 78 Fed. Reg. at 20,183.
216
37 C.F.R. § 11.108(e)(3).
217
Id. § 11.108(e)(4).
218
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8 cmt. 10 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). The comment
notes:

Lawyers may not subsidize lawsuits or administrative proceedings brought on behalf of
their clients, including making or guaranteeing loans to their clients for living expenses,
because to do so would encourage clients to pursue lawsuits that might not otherwise be
brought and because such assistance gives lawyers too great a financial stake in the litigation.
Id.; see also id. at cmt. 16 (“Paragraph (i) states the traditional general rule that lawyers are prohibited
from acquiring a proprietary interest in litigation. Like paragraph (e), the general rule has its basis in
common law champerty and maintenance and is designed to avoid giving the lawyer too great an
interest in the representation.”).
219
See 37 C.F.R. § 11.303.
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Nearly all of the USPTO Code provisions could be successfully mapped
to a corresponding USPTO Rule section. 220 The only exception was for
USPTO Code 10.23(a), which provided that “[a] practitioner shall not engage
in disreputable or gross misconduct.” 221 In reviewing each of the disciplinary
actions for which 10.23(a) was violated, however, it became clear that it was
nearly always identified along with more specific rules that described the precise
type of misconduct involved. 222 There were two disciplinary actions that identified only 10.23(a) as the rule that had been violated, but in both instances there
was clearly another specific provision that applied. 223 Those two rules were recoded accordingly and 10.23(a) was omitted from the analysis in Part V.
In total, the study identified only thirty-three categories over the sixteenyear period. This finding suggests that the USPTO relies on relatively few
rules as the basis for discipline, a topic explored later in the Article. 224

220
The initial plan was to map all the individual subsections of the USPTO Code and USPTO
Rules, but that task proved intractable given the differences between the USPTO Code and USPTO
Rules, as well as unnecessary given the low number of disciplinary actions. Thus, the provisions were
generally mapped at the ABA Rules section level, with subsections mapped for general rules that
included many disparate subsections (for example, misconduct and specific conflict of interest provisions). The only other exception was for the conflict of interest category, for which there were many
differences between the USPTO Rules and USPTO Code.
221
37 C.F.R. § 10.23 (2012) (repealed 2013).
222
See, e.g., In re Maiorino, No. D2004-11, at 1 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Aug. 9, 2004)
(final order) (finding violations of 37 C.F.R. §§ 10.23(a), 10.23(b)(3), 10.23(b)(6), and 10.23(c)(l) for a
sexual assault conviction).
223
In re Fuller, No. D2013-23, at 1 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Mar. 12, 2014) (final
order) (finding that respondent illegally photographed other persons); In re York, No. D2013-19, at 8–
9 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Nov. 18, 2013) (final order) (finding a violation of terms of fee
sharing agreement with associated law firm).
224
See discussion infra Part IV.
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Description

ABA Rule

USPTO Rule

USPTO Code

Competence
Scope of Representation

1.1

11.101

10.77(a), 10.77(b)

1.2

11.102

No equivalent rule

Diligence / Neglect

1.3

11.103

10.77(c), 10.84,
10.23(c)(3)

Communication

1.4

11.104

10.23(c)(8)

Fees

1.5

11.105

10.36

Confidentiality

1.6

11.106

10.57

1.7, 1.9(a),
1.10

11.107, 11.109(a),
11.110

10.62(a), 10.66

1.8(a)

11.108(a)

10.65

1.8(f)

11.108(f)

10.68

1.8(h)

11.108(h)

10.78

1.11

11.111

10.23(c)(19)–(20)

1.15

11.115

10.112

1.16

11.116

10.40

2.1

11.201

No equivalent

3.1

11.301

10.39

False Statements /
Fraud Before Office

3.3

11.303

10.85,
10.23(c)(2)(ii),
10.23(c)(14)–(15)

Fairness to Opposing
Party and Counsel

3.4

11.304

10.89(c)

3.5(b)

11.305(b)

10.93

4.1

11.401

No equivalent rule

5.3

11.503

No equivalent rule

5.4

11.504

10.37, 10.48, 10.49

5.5

11.505

10.23(c)(6), 10.47

Conflict of Interest
Business Transaction
with Client
Influence from ThirdParty Payer
Limitation on Liability
USPTO / Gov’t Employee
Safekeeping Property
Withdrawal / Termination
Candid Advice
Non-Meritorious
Claims

Ex Parte Communications
False Statements to
Third Parties
Violation in NonLawyer Assistance
Improper NonPractitioner Relationship
Assisting in Unauthorized Practice
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False Advertising

7.1

11.701

10.31

Improper Advertising

7.2

11.702

10.32

Improper Solicitation
Office Admission
Candor
Reporting Misconduct
Violation Through
Others

7.3

11.703

10.33

8.1

11.801

10.22(a)

8.3

11.803

10.24, 10.23(c)(16)

8.4(a)

11.804(a)

10.23(b)(2)

8.4(b)

11.804(b)

10.23(b)(3) & (c)(1)

8.4(c)

11.804(c)

8.4(d)

11.804(d)

No equivalent

11.804(h)

10.23(b)(4),
10.23(c)(2)(i)
10.23(b)(5),
10.23(c)(9)
10.23(c)(5)

No equivalent

11.804(i)

10.23(b)(6)

No equivalent

No equivalent

10.23(a)

Criminal Acts
General Misrepresentation
Administration of
Justice
Reciprocal Discipline
General Unfitness to
Practice
Disreputable or Gross
Misconduct

IV. PRACTITIONER DISCIPLINE: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
To evaluate the extent to which the OED is successful in carrying out its
responsibilities, this Part identifies and describes the purposes of practitioner
discipline and sanctions to provide the standards by which its work may be
judged. 225 Although a complete treatment of this topic is beyond the scope of
this Article, 226 several prevailing theories will be discussed. They will then be
framed within the somewhat distinct setting of USPTO practice to determine
the extent to which one or more theories should carry special weight.
A. Purposes of Practitioner Discipline
At the outset, it is important to note that disciplinary bodies and courts reviewing such cases rarely discuss the purposes behind imposing discipline outside of the context of a specific adjudication. 227 This phenomenon has not been
lost on those scholars, who argue forcefully that professional regulators should
See discussion infra Part IV.
See generally Leslie C. Levin, The Emperor’s Clothes and Other Tales About the Standards
for Imposing Lawyer Discipline Sanctions, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1998); Zacharias, supra note 33.
227
See Laurel S. Terry et al., Adopting Regulatory Objectives for the Legal Profession, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 2721–22 (2012) (noting that no U.S. jurisdiction has adopted regulatory objectives
for the profession, and contrasting it with other nations).
225
226
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more explicitly identify and prioritize the purposes behind discipline in order
to promote effectiveness and consistency. 228 Indeed, the lack of such guidance
would make it difficult for those who impose discipline to know how to do so
when there are competing considerations at stake. Nevertheless, several themes
predominate.
The first purpose, and the one most often cited, is the “protection of the
public.” 229 What is precisely meant by the phrase is up for debate, as it is
sometimes described in terms of the practitioner’s clients who have been directly affected by the misconduct. 230 Such a narrow conception is not fully explanatory, however, because discipline is imposed on conduct that has already
occurred and often does not include restitution to the client who has been
harmed. A second conception of “public” implicates protecting the practitioner’s other clients or future clients. 231 This purpose can be accomplished in one
of three ways: (1) by incapacitating the practitioner (through a term suspension
or exclusion), (2) by giving notice to others of the practitioner’s misconduct
and thereby affecting whether and how they engage with the practitioner, and
(3) by decreasing the likelihood that the practitioner engages in such misconduct again. But there is still a third conception of the “public,” one that extends
beyond the immediate practitioner-client relationship to others who might be
harmed. 232 This could include persons other than clients who would be adversely impacted were this practitioner to commit this type of misconduct in
the future. It could even be extended to include others who would be adversely
impacted if another practitioner were to commit this type of misconduct, under
the theory that the imposition of discipline against one practitioner might deter
others from committing misconduct themselves. 233
The second purpose behind lawyer discipline is the protection of the administration of justice. 234 This purpose is evident in many rules adopted by
See Zacharias, supra note 33, at 733–34.
Mary M. Devlin, The Development of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedures in the United States, 7
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 911, 939 (1994); Levin, supra note 226, at 20.
230
See Zacharias, supra note 33, at 695.
231
See id.; Janine C. Ogando, Note, Sanctioning Unfit Lawyers: The Need for Public Protection,
5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 459, 462 (1991) (noting that “[c]lients and future clients potentially suffer
the most harmful consequences” when courts do not appropriately sanction attorneys).
232
See Ogando, supra note 231, at 462 (directly linking lawyer discipline to the need for broadly
conceived public protection).
233
See Stephen Gillers, Lowering the Bar: How Lawyer Discipline in New York Fails to Protect
the Public, 17 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 485, 494 (2014); Julie Rose O’Sullivan, Professional
Discipline for Law Firms? A Response to Professor Schneyer’s Proposal, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1,
14 (2002).
234
Levin, supra note 226, at 17; see, e.g., In re Gortmaker, 782 P.2d 421, 424 (Or. 1989) (“The
purpose of professional discipline is to protect the public and the administration of justice from lawyers who have not discharged, will not discharge, or are unlikely to properly discharge their professional duties to their clients, the public, the legal system, and the legal profession.”).
228
229

2020]

An Empirical Study of Patent and Trademark Discipline

1649

disciplinary authorities, including ABA Rule 8.4(d), which explicitly prohibits
lawyers from “engag[ing] in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice.” 235 But its presence can also be seen through ABA Rules 3.1–3.9,
which impose discipline for a variety of activities that may have an adverse
impact on an adjudication, and in the Preamble to the ABA Rules that reminds
lawyers that they are “officer[s] of the legal system and . . . public citizen[s]
having special responsibility for the quality of justice.” 236 Thus, this purpose
pervades the ABA Rules and provides a lens through which they should be
understood.
The third purpose behind practitioner discipline is to instill and preserve
confidence in the legal profession. 237 This purpose comes under fire by scholars on account of the legal profession’s insistence on self-regulation that leads
some to question the degree to which discipline may be legitimately and accurately imposed. 238 Nevertheless, proponents of self-regulation tout the disciplinary process, and in particular the public imposition of discipline, 239 as essential for preserving public confidence. 240 This purpose has led scholars such as
Leslie Levin to argue in favor of increased transparency in disciplinary proceedings and broad publication of disciplinary proceedings. 241 It has also
fueled pushes for increased consistency, both across and within disciplinary
bodies, in the imposition of discipline and sanctions imposed. 242 Indeed, the
ABA Rules have been adopted in whole or large part by forty-nine states (California being the only exception) and four U.S. Territories, which should, in

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
Id. r. 3.1–.9.
237
Devlin, supra note 229, at 939; Levin, supra note 226, at 17–18.
238
See, e.g., David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 853
(1992); Fred C. Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1147, 1151 (2009); see also
Allen Blumenthal, Attorney Self-Regulation, Consumer Protection, and the Future of the Legal Profession, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 6, 11 (1993–1994).
239
Leslie C. Levin, The Case for Less Secrecy in Lawyer Discipline, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1,
29 (2007); Jacquelyn M. Desch, Note, Attorney Discipline Online, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 921, 938
(2016).
240
See COMM’N ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENF’T, AM. BAR ASS’N, LAWYER REGULATION FOR A NEW CENTURY (2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/
resources/report_archive/mckay_report/ [https://perma.cc/XQ59-4LX7] (recommending greater access to disciplinary action); see also Vincent R. Johnson, Justice Tom C. Clark’s Legacy in the Field
of Legal Ethics, 29 J. LEGAL PROF. 33, 66 (2005).
241
See Levin, supra note 226, at 71; see also Jennifer Carpenter & Thomas Cluderay, Note, Implications of Online Disciplinary Records: Balancing the Public’s Interest in Openness with Attorneys’ Concerns for Maintaining Flexible Self-Regulation, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 733, 740 (2009).
242
See Ogando, supra note 231, at 464.
235
236
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theory at least, serve to limit the variability across jurisdictions in terms of the
types of misconduct that are subject to discipline. 243
B. The Role of Sanctions
With these three purposes in mind—protection of the public, promotion
of the administration of justice, and the instilling of confidence in the legal
profession—further attention to the role of sanctions is warranted. In many
ways, disciplinary sanctions can be viewed as analogous to criminal sanctions,
and professional responsibility scholars have looked to the vast criminal law
literature in the area for guidance. 244
Yet there are important differences. Unlike criminal sanctions, disciplinary sanctions should not be grounded in retribution because the misconduct at
issue is not necessarily morally blameworthy but rather professionally incompetent. 245 To the extent that such conduct is simultaneously morally blameworthy, it can be vindicated instead through the criminal justice system. By contrast, disciplinary sanctions should be forward-looking and directed toward the
goal of ensuring that such misconduct not recur. 246 Furthermore, disciplinary
bodies rarely impose restitutionary sanctions and, in theory, aggrieved clients
or third parties would be able to pursue restitution through civil proceedings.247
This Article will focus instead on five goals to be served by sanctions: (1)
specific deterrence, (2) general deterrence, (3) incapacitation, (4) rehabilitation, and (5) expressions of disapproval. Sanctions that operate as specific deterrence will reduce the likelihood that the same practitioner will commit future misconduct. 248 Although in theory any type of sanction could operate as
specific deterrence, sanctions that include the imposition of probation should
lessen the likelihood that a practitioner will commit misconduct during the
probationary period. To the extent that prior misconduct will be considered an
243
See Alphabetical List of Jurisdictions Adopting Model Rules, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.
americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_
conduct/alpha_list_state_adopting_model_rules/ [https://perma.cc/EVK9-KJ8C]; see also John S.
Dzienkowski, Ethical Decisionmaking and the Design of Rules of Ethics, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 55, 57
(2013) (noting the success of the ABA in creating rules that are uniformly adopted, but arguing that
such rules have not kept up with changes in the profession).
244
See, e.g., Zacharias, supra note 226, at 683. See generally Nancy J. Moore, Mens Rea Standards in Lawyer Disciplinary Codes, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 (2010) (applying criminal law concepts to analyze and interpret lawyer disciplinary codes).
245
Zacharias, supra note 33, at 684.
246
Id. at 685–86.
247
See David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1145, 1177 (1993).
248
Stephen G. Bené, Note, Why Not Fine Attorneys?: An Economic Approach to Lawyer Disciplinary Sanctions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 907, 935 (1991).
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aggravating factor in a subsequent disciplinary proceeding, that fact could also
serve to increase the deterrent effect on the practitioner. 249
Sanctions that operate as general deterrence do so by virtue of their effect
on other practitioners, who are aware of the sanctions and conduct themselves
in a manner to ensure that they do not end up suffering the same fate as the
sanctioned practitioner. 250 But the effectiveness of sanctions as general deterrence is subject to a number of considerations. First, such sanctions must be
publicized in a way that other practitioners are made aware of them; otherwise,
they cannot operate as a deterrence to others. 251 Second, the deterrent effect of
sanctions should not be viewed in isolation. The public is likely only aware of
the infrequent, highly publicized cases, whereas lawyers themselves probably
change their actions in reaction to more frequent and commonplace prosecutions. 252 Thus, it is the practitioner’s perception that he or she might likely face
discipline that might deter him or her from committing misconduct, but such a
perception will only be formed if the person is aware that a number of other
practitioners have been disciplined for similar actions. 253
Incapacitating sanctions prevent practitioners from committing future
misconduct because the sanction prohibits them from representing clients or
otherwise engaging in the profession. 254 The two types of incapacitating sanctions are suspension and disbarment. 255 Disbarment is termed “exclusion”
when imposed by the USPTO. 256 Although suspension generally lasts for a
definite period of time, 257 exclusion is theoretically permanent—subject to the
practitioner successfully petitioning for reinstatement after a minimum period
249
Compare Benjamin B. Sendor, The Relevance of Conduct and Character to Guilt and Punishment, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 99, 127 (1996) (noting that consideration of past
acts is consistent with a specific deterrence theory), with Carissa Byrne Hessick, Why Are Only Bad
Acts Good Sentencing Factors?, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1109, 1150 (2008) (calling into question the utility
of aggravating factors as an effective deterrent).
250
See Bené, supra note 248, at 935.
251
See Levin, supra note 226, at 72.
252
Zacharias, supra note 33, at 729; see also Fred C. Zacharias, What Lawyers Do When Nobody’s Watching: Legal Advertising as a Case Study of the Impact of Underenforced Professional
Rules, 87 IOWA L. REV. 971, 1005–06 (2002) (discussing effects of underenforcement on attorneys’
propensity to violate ethical rules).
253
Cf. Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal Deterrence?, 100
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765, 819 (2010) (applying the concept in the criminal context).
254
Bené, supra note 248, at 933–34; see DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS
956 (4th ed. 2004) (noting incapacitation as one of the predominant justifications for lawyer discipline).
255
Kevin Hopkins, The Politics of Misconduct: Rethinking How We Regulate Lawyer-Politicians,
57 RUTGERS L. REV. 839, 860 (2005).
256
35 U.S.C. § 32 (2018).
257
But see 37 C.F.R. § 11.25 (2019) (providing for interim suspensions that will last until there is
an opportunity for a formal disciplinary proceeding).
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of time, usually five years. 258 Given the economic and professional impacts of
incapacitating sanctions, they are to be limited to more egregious instances of
practitioner misconduct. 259
As with incapacitating sanctions, rehabilitative sanctions are aimed toward eliminating future misconduct, but they do so by imposing measures on
the practitioner that promote ongoing conformity with the rules. 260 Three
common rehabilitative sanctions include probation (often with ongoing monitoring of client matters or funds), mandatory education in professional responsibility, and mandatory mental health or chemical dependency treatment. 261
Often, these conditions are imposed in addition to more traditional sanctions
and have become increasingly common even as rehabilitation has somewhat
gone out of favor among criminal law theorists. 262
Unlike the aforementioned types of sanctions, an expressive sanction is
one that primarily expresses disapproval of practitioner conduct rather than
imposing significant limitations or conditions on a practitioner’s future professional activities. 263 There are two primary types of expressive sanctions: the
private warning (sometimes called an admonition or a warning letter) and the
public reprimand. 264 Whereas the former sends an expressive signal only to the
disciplined practitioner, the latter may send a signal to other practitioners or to
the public that such conduct is disapproved and, if repeated, could be subject to
more severe sanction. 265
Of course, a particular sanction or set of sanctions could simultaneously
serve multiple purposes. For example, a public reprimand could operate as
specific deterrence (lessening the likelihood that the practitioner herself would
commit future misconduct), as general deterrence (lessening the likelihood that
other practitioners would commit similar types of misconduct in the future),
and as an expressive signal that such conduct will not be condoned. That said,
a sanction such as a public reprimand may have a stronger expressive effect
than a deterrent effect. Part V will examine the imposition of USPTO sanctions
in light of the degree to which they serve particular purposes. 266
258
Id. § 11.60(b) (“An excluded practitioner shall be eligible to apply for reinstatement no earlier
than at least five years from the effective date of the exclusion.”).
259
Hopkins, supra note 255, at 860; Levin, supra note 226, at 21.
260
See Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Liana G.T. Wolf, The Paradox and Promise of Restorative
Attorney Discipline, 12 NEV. L.J. 253, 299 (2012).
261
See Levin, supra note 226, at 24.
262
Id. at 23.
263
See id. at 22; cf. Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
591, 602–03 (1996) (discussing the expressive character of sanctions in the context of criminal law).
264
The USPTO issues private warning letters. See 37 C.F.R. § 11.21 (2019).
265
See Levin, supra note 226, at 22–23.
266
See discussion infra Part V.
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C. The USPTO Practice Setting
In comparison to the practice of law in a particular state, which varies
widely among its licensed attorneys, practice before the USPTO is considerably more focused. This focus arguably should influence how the OED approaches practitioner discipline, in order to ensure that its work further promotes the USPTO’s ultimate mission.
As the federal gatekeeper for patent issuance and trademark registration,
one of the USPTO’s primary responsibilities is ensuring accuracy while promoting innovation and enterprise. 267 With many determinations being made on
an ex parte basis, the application process, 268 substantive requirements, 269 and
USPTO Rules 270 all highlight the overriding importance of the duty of candor
and good faith in dealings with the Office. Even in the years during which the
empirical study was conducted, the USPTO promulgated additional rules and
revamped its application forms to impress upon practitioners the seriousness of
these obligations. 271
Ultimately, the USPTO justifies its focus on candor as being linked to the
fact that its decisions affect the public interest—not just the immediate applicant’s rights, but those third parties that may rely on that recognition of intellectual property rights in conducting their own affairs. 272 Those third parties
may include future competitors, who decline to use a particular mark for fear
of infringing on a pre-existing registered trademark. It may include investors,
who use the issuance of a patent as an official stamp of approval on the viability of an invention. Viewed in this manner, protection of the public—broadly
defined—is arguably paramount. Equally important, these third parties gener267
See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 2018–2022 STRATEGIC PLAN, at 2 (2018), https://
www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USPTO_2018-2022_Strategic_Plan.pdf [https://perma.
cc/Y3RX-DSTW]. The USPTO defines its mission as:

fostering innovation, competitiveness and job growth in the United States by conducting high quality and timely patent and trademark examination and review proceedings
in order to produce reliable and predictable intellectual property rights; guiding intellectual property policy, and improving intellectual property rights protection; and delivering intellectual property information and education worldwide.
Id.

See discussion supra Parts I.A and I.C.
See discussion supra Parts I.B and I.D.
270
See discussion supra Part III.B.
271
See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 42.51 (2019) (providing disclosure requirements); Amendments to the
Rules of Practice for Trials Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 81 Fed. Reg. 18,750, 18,761
(June 16, 2016) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42) (heightening disclosure requirements).
272
Iancu, Remarks at International Trademark Association, supra note 8; see Changes to Representation of Others Before the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 78 Fed. Reg. 20,178,
20,184 (Apr. 3, 2013) (to be codified in scattered parts of 37 C.F.R.) (“All decisions made by the
[USPTO] in patent and trademark matters affect the public interest.”).
268
269
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ally are not participants in the prosecution process, for they have neither the
relevant information nor the inclination to be involved at the early stages of an
applicant’s commercial enterprise.
With regard to the administration of justice, the USPTO has suggested
that it is especially interested in ensuring that practitioners are responsive to
inquiries from its employees, including the OED itself. 273 Again, without the
benefit of a true adversarial process, the USPTO simultaneously serves as decisionmaker and healthy skeptic. Thus, it would be expected that its emphasis
on the administration of justice be related to those activities that could thwart
the ability of the USPTO to reach timely, impartial, and accurate decisions.274
But what about instilling confidence in the profession? In contrast to the
legal profession that is largely self-governing, USPTO practitioners do not
regulate themselves. The disciplinary rules are initially enforced by USPTO
employees, and the hearing officers are administrative law judges from a variety of fields. That separation should make it less likely that outsiders would
view the system as a captured one—at least in comparison to the legal profession. Furthermore, although the popular media and general public sometimes
have a low opinion of attorneys, that view is not especially prevalent when it
comes to practitioners. 275 That is not to say that the OED should ignore or
overlook this purpose, but rather that this purpose may be secondary to the
others discussed above.
A final point to raise is the relationship between OED discipline and that
which may be imposed by state disciplinary authorities. At least when it comes
to practitioners who are also attorneys, there are certain types of misconduct
that arguably seem as or better suited to be investigated by a state disciplinary
authority rather than by the OED. Such examples could include criminal acts
that may reflect poorly on the practitioner-attorney’s character and fitness but
that do not have any direct connection to the subject matter of their practice
273
See Changes to Representation of Others Before the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 78 Fed. Reg. at 20,193 (“A practitioner’s duty to cooperate fully with OED is vital to maintaining
the integrity of the legal profession, which is an important duty owed by a practitioner to the public,
the bar, the profession, and the Office.”).
274
See id. (“A practitioner’s compliance with the duty to cooperate has recently become even
more essential to maintaining the integrity of the profession in light of the shorter statutory time allowed for the OED Director to complete a full and fair investigation of a practitioner’s alleged misconduct.”).
275
See, e.g., LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF
LAW 6–8 (4th ed. 2016) (presenting public opinion data indicating that public perception of attorneys
is low); Honesty/Ethics in Professions, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1654/honesty-ethicsprofessions.aspx [https://perma.cc/X5N7-FZ6Q] (finding that 22% of the American public rate the
honesty and ethical standards of lawyers as “Very High” or “High,” and 28% rate lawyers’ standards
as “Low or Very Low”). These ratings are lower than those for nurses, medical doctors, police officers, and bankers. Honesty/Ethics in Professions, supra.
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before the USPTO. Even client trust account violations, although indirectly
related to attorneys’ USPTO practice, are quite likely more pervasive than
among their trademark or patent clients (assuming that their practice is not so
limited). By contrast, the OED would be the optimal disciplinary authority to
investigate practitioners who have improper relationships with nonpractitioners in prosecuting patents, prosecute fraudulent applications, or violate USPTO-specific rules such as the duty of disclosure.
V. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF USPTO PRACTITIONER DISCIPLINE
With this theoretical foundation in place, this Article now turns to the critical practical question of how the OED is carrying out its responsibility to mete
out discipline. To address this question, a comprehensive study was conducted of
all public discipline imposed on practitioners between January 1, 2003, and December 31, 2018. This Part begins with a discussion of the methodology employed, including the rationale behind the strategic coding and analytical decisions made. 276 It then presents the results of the study and the implications that
may be drawn, first for USPTO practitioners as a whole and then specifically
comparing and contrasting the discipline imposed on patent and trademark
practitioners. 277 It concludes with a discussion of the ethics rules that form the
basis of discipline, identifying four common patterns of misconduct and the
inferences that might be made about the OED’s work and current focus. 278
A. Methodology
To evaluate the imposition of USPTO discipline, it was necessary first to
compile all disciplinary actions for the time period of interest. The USPTO
provides access to all decisions from disciplinary hearings through the OED
Reading Room, a searchable database that compiles information online pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. 279 In addition to disciplinary orders, the
OED Reading Room contains a number of decisions related to practitioner
admission that could be a fruitful topic for additional research. 280
Initially, this project isolated only those disciplinary orders that were categorized as “Final Decision” or “Final Order,” because the USPTO website

See discussion infra Part V.A.
See discussion infra Parts V.B and V.C.
278
See discussion infra Part V.D.
279
FOIA Documents, supra note 163.
280
Id.; see, e.g., In re Graham, No. D2013-09, at 3–4 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office July 17,
2013) (final order) (ordering respondent’s suspension and describing steps he must take prior to reinstatement to practice before the USPTO).
276
277
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suggested that those designations would capture all disciplinary actions. 281 But
this was under-inclusive, as there were a large number of documents labeled
“Initial Decision” that did not include a corresponding “Final Decision.” 282 In
inspecting those later documents, the reason became clear: each included language that the disciplined practitioner had thirty days to appeal the initial decision or else it would become a final decision. Accordingly, those decisions—
the vast majority of which were default judgments—were included. There
were also some decisions that were labeled in unconventional ways, such as
“Memorandum and Order” or “Judgment.” 283 Each of those was reviewed further to determine whether it should be considered a final judgment on discipline and categorized accordingly.
Once the complete set of disciplinary orders was retrieved, all were manually reviewed to determine whether they should be included in the dataset.
Each document is titled in the following manner: “D[YEAR]-XX.” 284 The year
appears to generally correspond to the year in which the investigation was
opened. Seven decisions corresponded to a year earlier than 2003 but these
decisions were still included in the analysis because state disciplinary authorities likewise report their activities according to the year of decision and include any cases originating in an earlier year. 285
There were two types of discipline that were excluded from the analysis.
First, there were twelve disciplinary orders that imposed an interim suspension, which is imposed when a practitioner has been convicted of a serious
crime. 286 In those instances, the practitioner is then referred to a formal disciplinary proceeding based on the same misconduct, and thus there should be

281
See Finding a Patent Practitioner, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.
uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/patent-and-trademark-practitioners/finding-patent-practitioner
[https://perma.cc/5PYB-33HX] (“For information about practitioners who have been disciplined,
search OED Final Decisions in the FOIA Reading Room.”).
282
See, e.g., In re Robinson, No. D2009-48 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office July 1, 2010)
(providing an example of an “Initial Decision” without a corresponding “Final Decision”).
283
See, e.g., In re Myers, No. D2015-33 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Dec. 31, 2015)
(providing an example of a decision labeled as a “Judgment”); In re Halvonik, No. D2006-15 (U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office Jan. 21, 2009) (providing an example of a decision labeled as a “Memorandum and Order”).
284
See FOIA Documents, supra note 163.
285
See, e.g., STANDING COMM. ON PROF’L DISCIPLINE, AM. BAR ASS’N, 2015 SURVEY ON LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS 5–7 (2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
professional_responsibility/2015_sold_results.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7VP-N45V] (listing the number
of ethics complaints pending from prior years). There were two decisions from investigations that
began in 1999, one from 2000, two from 2001, and two from 2002.
286
See 37 C.F.R. § 11.25 (2019) (providing for interim suspension and discipline based on conviction of a serious crime).
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later disciplinary actions that cover the misconduct at issue in these orders.287
Second, there were four disciplinary orders in which practitioners were transferred to inactive status on account of a disability that rendered them incapable
to practice law. 288 Though styled as a “disciplinary action,” these orders do not
fall within the aim of this study and were excluded.
After this scrubbing was completed, each order was read and coded according to the type of practitioner who had been disciplined, i.e. patent agent,
patent attorney, or trademark attorney. But of course, some lawyers prosecute
both patents and trademarks, and the misconduct at issue might involve one or
both of their practices. Accordingly, each order was coded by the practice area(s) in which the misconduct had occurred and whether the practitioner was
an attorney at the time of the proceeding. 289 In cases of reciprocal discipline,
practitioners were coded according to their practice area(s) rather than the areas in which the underlying misconduct occurred, unless it was clear that the
underlying misconduct was in fact related to one or both practice areas.
In addition to other variables related to the disciplinary process itself (for
example, whether the practitioner had responded or entered into a settlement
agreement), each order was coded according to the disciplinary rule(s) violated, sanction type, sanction length, and whether additional conditions had been
imposed. 290 Finally, a summary of the relevant misconduct was prepared in
order to better elucidate some of the frequently occurring fact patterns in disciplinary cases.
Of the 410 “public” disciplinary orders in the final set, five practitioners
received a “private” reprimand. 291 These orders removed any identifying practitioner information but still provided insight into the misconduct at issue. In
the analysis that follows, these orders are combined with the public reprimands
when considered collectively but specifically identified when relevant to understanding the “public” nature of discipline imposed on a specific practitioner.
To contextualize the frequency and severity of USPTO discipline, a separate dataset was compiled of lawyer discipline by state authorities using information published by the ABA Standing Committee on Professional Discipline.
287
See id. § 11.25(b)(5) (“Upon entering a final order imposing interim suspension, the USPTO
Director shall refer the complaint to a hearing officer to conduct a formal disciplinary proceeding.”).
288
See id. § 11.20(c) (providing for transfer to disability inactive status).
289
For patent disciplinary actions, individuals were denoted as an attorney if they were designated “patent attorney” or if the order stated that the individual was licensed to practice law.
290
Orders imposing suspensions required additional attention, as a significant number of them
immediately stayed the suspension and instead put the practitioner on probation. For these orders,
both the suspension and alternative disposition were captured.
291
See, e.g., In re [Anonymous], No. D2006-17, at 3 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Apr. 30,
2007) (final order) (stating that a patent attorney had reached a settlement agreement whereby they
would be privately reprimanded).
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Each year, this committee releases results from the Survey of Lawyer Discipline (ABA SOLD), which is completed by nearly all state lawyer disciplinary
authorities. 292 When necessary, the study was supplemented with additional
data sources noted in the following analysis.
To provide an accurate comparison of the frequency of discipline among
different disciplinary authorities, it was necessary to identify the number of
practitioners or lawyers who were subject to such discipline. Although the
ABA SOLD contains that information for each reporting state, there is no readily available comparable data for USPTO practitioners. The OED shares current information on the number of “active” patent practitioners, but there is no
historical repository containing those numbers. 293 Nevertheless, an estimate for
patent practitioners was constructed based on several known years of data and
the corresponding trends in the patent practitioner population. 294
An estimate was even harder to develop for trademark attorneys, because
the OED has no registration process or other methods for identifying who is
subject to its jurisdiction. The USPTO does compile historical data on each
trademark application, which may include the name of the attorney who is
prosecuting it. 295 This field required considerable scrubbing, however, because
many of the “names” are not in fact names of attorneys at all. 296 After this data
was scrubbed, attorneys were considered active for a particular year if they had
prosecuted a trademark application sometime within the prior three calendar
years. From there, the number of active attorneys was calculated for each year
during the time period of interest.

292
See STANDING COMM. ON PROF’L DISCIPLINE, AM. BAR ASS’N, 2016 SURVEY ON LAWYER
DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS (2018), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/2016sold_results.pdf [https://perma.cc/NSH9-S96F] (providing the results of
the 2016 survey); see also Historical ABA S.O.L.D. Surveys, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.american
bar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/historicalabasoldsurveys/ [https://perma.cc/3EZ6HX84] (providing links to previous surveys from 1998 to 2016). Although survey data from 2003 to
2016 are available, estimates for 2017 and 2018 have been created by using a combination of the five
year average and annual trend. For example, if the five year average was 100 but there had been a 20
point decrease during each year, the following year would be estimated at 80.
293
See discussion supra Part II.A.
294
The number of active patent practitioners was available for five of the sixteen years. These
numbers were used as a starting point for constructing the estimate of active practitioners, with adjustments for the changes in the number of known patent application filings.
295
See Trademark Case Files Dataset, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.
gov/learning-and-resources/electronic-data-products/trademark-case-files-dataset-0 [https://perma.cc/
ND8D-K9K3] (containing the research datasets along with documents describing the data). See generally Graham et al., supra note 93 (providing trademark application data).
296
Many of the entries in this field were not names, but rather numbers or parts of addresses (e.g.,
WI 53202-4910). These were removed from the analysis, as it was unclear whether the application
had been filed by an attorney and, in these cases, the identity of the attorney was also unclear.
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B. Overall Results
As an initial matter, the frequency of practitioner discipline was calculated
over time. Although the OED publicly disciplined twenty-six practitioners
on average each year between 2003 and 2018, there was an upward trend
over that timeframe. But, as Figure I illustrates, that trend was irregular and
inconsistent, particularly with the large spike in disciplinary actions (fifty)
in 2010.
Figure I: OED-Imposed Public Discipline by Year

Additional analysis sheds some insight on one reason for the disparity:
reciprocal discipline. As Part II.C explained, the OED is vigilant in its imposition of reciprocal discipline for attorneys disciplined by another state bar authority. Figures II and III below demonstrate how reciprocal discipline shapes
and impacts the OED’s work. It comprises nearly half of all public discipline
imposed, and over two-thirds (23/34) of the discipline in 2018. Likewise, although there were fifty practitioners who received public discipline in 2010,
only twenty of those were actually the result of an OED investigation and the
rest were reciprocal discipline cases.
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Figure II. Composition of OED Public Discipline

Figure III. USPTO and Reciprocal Discipline by Year

Although the small numbers of disciplinary actions suggest that the OED
does not seem to frequently impose discipline, the question arises of how these
numbers might compare to other disciplinary authorities—is the OED disciplining fewer practitioners than its state counterparts? Figure IV below demonstrates that it is indeed imposing less discipline, even though there has been a
significant increase in practitioner discipline over the sixteen-year time period
coupled with an overall decline in state attorney discipline during that same
time frame.
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Figure IV. Imposition of Public Discipline (per 10,000 Active Practitioners)

On average over the sixteen years studied, just 4.0 out of every 10,000
practitioners were subject to public discipline by the OED, in comparison to
26.9 attorneys from their respective state authorities. Even this statistic overinflates OED discipline, because 45% of those were in fact reciprocal discipline
already included among the state disciplinary statistics. Although there has
been a general upward trend in OED discipline relative to state discipline, it
has remained between 4.6 and 5.1 practitioners per 10,000 since 2015—a rate
that is less than one-fourth of the rate of state discipline during that time.
Figures V and VI provide further insight into the relative distribution of
public sanctions imposed, as well as the frequency of alternative dispositions.
At first glance, these two figures may seem somewhat contradictory. On the
one hand, the OED imposes relatively more punitive sanctions than its state
counterparts. On the other hand, the OED imposes considerably more private
discipline and terms of probation.
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Figure V: Type of Public Sanction Imposed

Figure VI: Other Sanctions

But taken together, a theme begins to emerge in terms of the purposes
these sanctions serve. Each of the heavily imposed USPTO sanctions furthers
the goal of specific deterrence, in that they are limited to the knowledge of the
practitioner (private warnings), they ensure that the practitioner conforms his
or her future conduct to the USPTO Rules (probation), or they incapacitate a
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practitioner who cannot conform his or her conduct to the USPTO Rules (exclusion, and to a lesser extent, suspension). 297
At the same time, USPTO sanctioning practice does not appear to prioritize the goals of general deterrence or expressiveness to the same extent. 298 As
a general matter, the practitioner population will not know of the prevalence of
private sanctions—indeed, it is not even published on the USPTO website—
and it certainly will not learn of the specific conduct which led to it. Likewise,
the existence of relatively few public reprimands means that the practitioner
population will not learn of many examples in the mid-level category of misconduct falling below that which would operate as a suspension. This circumstance, coupled with the low number of disciplinary actions overall, means that
practitioners have little available guidance on the boundaries of permissible
conduct in their USPTO practice.
C. Comparing the Discipline of Patent and Trademark Practitioners
Although the preceding Section sheds some light on the degree to which
the OED is using its disciplinary function to regulate practitioner conduct, it is
only the beginning of the story. As was described in Parts II and III, patent and
trademark practitioners are not situated similarly in relation to the USPTO.
Whereas patent practitioners must satisfy several requirements to become registered, attorneys who wish to practice before the USPTO need only find willing clientele and they can begin a trademark prosecution practice. Moreover,
there is a marked difference between the two in the way that the USPTO communicates practitioners’ obligations. The patent practitioners’ duty of candor
and possible sanctions upon violation are well-known, but the same is not true
for the obligations imposed on trademark attorneys. 299 This Section explores
whether that distinction carries through to the OED’s work, despite the fact
that ostensibly it regulates both sets of practitioners in the same manner.
Figures VII and VIII below reveal the staggering differences in patent and
trademark discipline, showing that 77% of all public disciplinary actions involve those who prosecute patents. Though there has been a slight increase in
the discipline of trademark attorneys since 2014, that trend is nearly comparable for patent practitioners as well. In 2018, for instance, only 32% (11/34) of
all disciplinary actions involved trademark practice alone.

See discussion supra Part IV.B.
See discussion supra Part IV.B.
299
See discussion supra Parts II.B and II.D.
297
298
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Figure VII: OED Discipline Frequency by Practice Area

Figure VIII: OED Discipline by Practice Area Over Time

Figures IX and X below demonstrate that these differences cannot be fully explained by the disparities in the sizes of the practitioner populations or in
the number of USPTO applications filed.

2020]

An Empirical Study of Patent and Trademark Discipline

1665

Figure IX: Imposition of Public Discipline (per 10,000 Active Practitioners)

Figure X: Imposition of Public Discipline (per 100,000 Application Filings)

Even when accounting for the larger pool of patent practitioners or the
larger number of patent applications filed, there is still a significant difference
between trademark and patent practices in regard to discipline. 300 In fact, dur300
During the relevant time period, there were averages of 497,004 patent filings and 407,152
trademark filings each year. That gap has been narrowing, however, with 643,349 patent filings and
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ing the three-year period between 2006 and 2008, there were no disciplinary
actions based on trademark practice alone—an astonishing statistic. These figures should not necessarily suggest that patent practitioners are unduly targeted
or over-represented; a quick comparison between Figure VIII and Figure IV
indicates that they are subject to less discipline by the OED than are attorneys
by their respective state authorities. Rather, these figures seem to indicate that
trademark attorneys are significantly under-represented among those receiving
discipline. Although discipline for both types of practices is trending upward,
the increase is neither steep nor consistent across the time period.
Figure XI presents the frequency with which different types of sanctions
are imposed on practitioners in the two practice areas. 301 It demonstrates that
trademark practitioners receive less punitive sanctions than their patent counterparts. Figure XII provides additional detail on the length of suspensions for
each group.
Figure XI: Type of Sanction by Practice Area

638,847 trademark filings in 2018. With regards to practitioners, there was an estimated average of
41,213 patent practitioners, as compared to 32,198 trademark practitioners. The gap between the two
widened to 13,590 in 2018.
301
Figure XI and the figures that follow exclude reciprocal discipline cases because the OED
does not play a role in determining the type of sanction imposed by the initiating state.
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Figure XII: Average Length of Suspension (in Months) by Practice Area

Several trends emerge. First, it is clear that the most severe sanctions are
imposed among those practitioners in the “both” category. That result is not
surprising, however, once one considers how that category is constructed; by
definition, the proscribed misconduct included both patent and trademark
prosecution. Given the inherently larger scope of misconduct, it would be expected that the corresponding sanctions would be more punitive on average.
Comparing patent- and trademark-only practitioners, patent practitioners have
a higher representation among each of the more severe incapacitating sanctions
(involuntary exclusion, exclusion on consent, suspension), whereas trademark
practitioners are much more likely to receive a reprimand.
Patent practitioners also serve longer suspensions on average than their
trademark counterparts. Though there is not comprehensive statewide data
available on this subject, 302 available evidence suggests that patent practitioners are likely serving even longer suspensions than they would have, had the
sanction been imposed by a state authority. 303 Once again, those practitioners

302
Notably, the ABA Survey on Lawyer Discipline does not require states to provide information
on the average length of suspensions; such data could be beneficial to an understanding of this issue.
See, e.g., STANDING COMM. ON PROF’L DISCIPLINE, supra note 292, at 1.
303
See Patricia W. Hatamyar & Kevin M. Simmons, Are Women More Ethical Lawyers? An
Empirical Study, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 785, 820 (2004) (finding an 11.26-month mean term of suspension and six month median term of suspension for attorneys, with statistically significant differences by gender).
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committing misconduct across both practice areas are receiving the longest
suspensions on average.
D. Ethics Rules Violated by USPTO Practitioners
Given the differences between patent and trademark practice, along with
the disparity between the two in terms of the types of discipline imposed, one
would expect there to be corresponding differences between the two in regard
to the number and types of ethics rules that are cited as providing the basis for
discipline. Figure XIII provides the number of ethics rules cited in all public
disciplinary orders, and Figure XIV further calculates the average number of
rules cited for each practice area.
Figure XIII: Number of Ethics Rules Cited in Disciplinary Orders

Figure XIV: Number of Ethics Rules Cited by Practice Area
Overall
Patent
Trademark
Both

Mean Rules Cited
3.5
3.2
3.6
5.6

Median Rules Cited
3
3
4
5

As Figure XIII indicates, more than eighty percent of USPTO disciplinary
actions cited two or more ethics rules that provided the basis for discipline.
Unexpectedly, trademark disciplinary cases cite more ethics rules on average
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than do patent cases (3.6 vs. 3.2), even though the former lead to less severe
sanctions on average. 304
This mismatch between the number of rule violations and severity of
sanctions may contribute to the perception among patent practitioners that they
must be wary of the threat of OED investigation. Even a cursory Internet
search reveals a number of articles and blog posts about patent practitioner
discipline and best practices to avoid getting in trouble. 305 The same is not true
for trademark discipline, about which there is little discussion.
Armed with the knowledge that most OED disciplinary actions implicate
more than one ethics rule, this Section now turns to the more nuanced question
of what types of misconduct give rise to disciplinary actions. Figure XV presents an initial picture using the categories identified in Part III.C, both for the
overall practitioner population and by practice area. The number under the label in parentheses corresponds to the number of disciplinary actions in that
category.
Figure XV: Ethics Rules Cited as Source of OED Discipline
Misconduct
Category
Diligence
General
Misrepresentation
Administration
of Justice
General Unfitness
to Practice
Communication
Client Property
and Accounting
Competence
Criminal Acts
Cooperation
with OED
Assisting Unauthorized Practice
Termination Issues
Truthfulness

Overall
(221)
45.7%

Patent
(174)
44.3%

Trademark
(23)
34.8%

Both
(24)
66.7%

44.3%

40.8%

43.5%

70.8%

40.3%

35.6%

47.8%

66.7%

35.3%

36.2%

26.1%

37.5%

29.4%

26.4%

21.7%

58.3%

21.3%

21.3%

8.7%

33.3%

14.9%
12.7%

11.5%
14.9%

17.4%
4.3%

37.5%
4.2%

12.2%

10.9%

8.7%

25.0%

11.8%

5.7%

26.1%

41.7%

10.9%
10.0%

9.2%
8.0%

8.7%
13.0%

25.0%
20.8%

See discussion supra Part V.C.
See, e.g., Michael E. McCabe, Jr., This Post Could Save Your Patent Law License, MCCABE
LAW (June 1, 2017), https://www.ipethicslaw.com/this-post-could-save-your-patent-law-license/ [https://
perma.cc/5X48-7ME8] (discussing administrative suspensions of patent practitioners at the USPTO).
304
305
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Misconduct
Category
to USPTO

Overall
(221)

Patent
(174)

Trademark
(23)

Both
(24)

Conflict of Interest
Improper Influence
by Third Party
Relationship with
Non-Practitioner
Fairness to Opposing Parties
Fees
Scope of
Representation
False Advertising
Violation of Rules
Through Others
Confidentiality
Reporting
Misconduct
Improper Oversight
of Non-Practitioner
Improper Business
Transactions with
Client
Limitation of Liability
Gov’t Employee
Conflict
Candid Advice
Truthfulness to
Others
Ex Parte
Communications
Improper Advertising
Improper Solicitation

9.5%

8.6%

17.4%

8.3%

9.0%

9.2%

13.0%

4.2%

8.1%

7.5%

17.4%

4.2%

6.3%

5.7%

4.3%

12.5%

5.4%

6.3%

0.0%

4.2%

4.5%

4.6%

4.3%

4.2%

4.5%

2.3%

13.0%

12.5%

3.2%

2.9%

4.3%

4.2%

2.3%

2.9%

0.0%

0.0%

1.8%

1.1%

4.3%

4.2%

1.8%

0.6%

4.3%

8.3%

1.4%

1.1%

4.3%

0.0%

0.9%

0.6%

0.0%

4.2%

0.9%

0.6%

4.3%

0.0%

0.9%

1.1%

0.0%

0.0%

0.5%

0.6%

0.0%

0.0%

0.5%

0.0%

4.3%

0.0%

0.5%

0.6%

0.0%

0.0%

0.5%

0.0%

4.3%

0.0%

After diligence, which is the most prevalent ethics rule that forms the basis of discipline (45.7%), the next three most frequently cited provisions are all
part of the general misconduct rule—misrepresentation (44.3%), actions that
are prejudicial to the administration of justice (40.3%), and actions that reflect
adversely on one’s fitness to practice before the USPTO (35.3%). This is notable, in part because there is criticism among some ethics scholars about the
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over-reliance on these provisions by state disciplinary authorities together with
the difficulty for practitioners to understand what types of misconduct are subject to these rules. 306 Indeed, as mentioned in Part III.B, the ABA Rules eliminated the “fitness to practice” provision on account of these concerns. 307
These concerns are especially salient when it comes to USPTO practice.
The USPTO purports to give heightened attention to misconduct related to the
duties of candor and good faith and yet there are relatively few disciplinary
actions related to that type of misconduct. As Figure XV demonstrates, the ethics provisions that are most clearly linked to these duties—truthfulness toward
the USPTO (the twelfth most frequently cited), fairness to opposing parties
(the sixteenth most frequently cited), and confidentiality (the twenty-first most
frequently cited)—all rank outside of the top ten most frequently cited rules.
Although there is some variation between trademark and patent practices,
these statistics must be interpreted with caution given the small number of
trademark cases in the dataset (twenty-three). So, despite the fact that there are
relatively more trademark cases which cite truthfulness in actions toward the
USPTO as the source of misconduct (13% versus 10% overall), that rule only
appears in a total of three trademark cases over the entire sixteen-year time
period.
Figure XVI provides further insight into the interrelationship between the
top ten ethics rules cited, in order to begin to identify typical patterns of misconduct that give rise to disciplinary actions. Each cell contains the Pearson
correlation coefficient between the two ethics rules, with statistically significant correlations denoted by one (significant at .05 level) or two (significant at
.01 level) stars. All correlations above .200 have been highlighted as well. The
strongest correlation is between diligence and communication, which is very
high at .504.

306
307

See discussion supra Part III.B and note 227.
See discussion supra Part III.B.
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Figure XVI: Correlations Between Top 10 Cited Ethics Rules

Using these correlations as a starting point, this Article identifies and describes four commonly observed patterns of misconduct that simultaneously
implicate strongly correlated rules. This is the first such categorization in the
scholarly literature, which could be replicated for other disciplinary authorities
in the future. Each category is described in further detail below.
1. The Financial Fool
One of the most frequent patterns of misconduct leading to OED discipline involves practitioners who submit fee payments to the USPTO that are
dishonored for insufficient funds, often triggering violations of the diligence
and client property/accounting provisions. These disciplinary actions are nearly exclusively limited to patent practitioners due to various filing fees that
must be submitted over the course of the life of a patent; the most common
sanctions for violations include public reprimands and term suspensions. 308
In re Guth in 2011 is paradigmatic of these disciplinary actions. 309 The
OED received information from the USPTO Office of Finance that Guth had
issued ten checks that were dishonored due to insufficient funds. This infor308
See, e.g., In re King, No. D2015-29, at 6–11 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office May 26,
2015) (final order) (ordering a public reprimand for eleven dishonored electronic and check payments
to USPTO); In re Perkowski, No. D2011-11, at 3–4 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office June 17,
2011) (final order) (ordering a two-year suspension, stayed pursuant to settlement agreement, for
eighteen dishonored checks).
309
See No. D2010-37 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Feb. 11, 2011) (final order).
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mation triggered an OED investigation that revealed a number of mishandled
transactions and patent applications that were under threat of abandonment due
to Guth’s financial neglect. Guth’s actions were the result of poor accounting
practices, and he undertook remedial action and cooperated with the OED investigation to mitigate his misconduct. Pursuant to a settlement agreement,
Guth received a two-year suspension that was stayed and replaced by a twoyear probation. 310
2. The Overcommitted Practitioner
Another common scenario giving rise to discipline is where an experienced practitioner begins neglecting a series of applications, apparently because the practitioner is overcommitted. They start missing deadlines, 311 cutting corners, 312 and leaving the client out of the communications loop.313 Eventually these actions come to light, often by a client who asks about the status of
an abandoned application. 314 At this point, the more ethical practitioners will
reveal the misconduct and attempt to ameliorate it. 315 But the less scrupulous
will attempt to cover up their mistakes with lies—first to their client and sometimes even to the OED. 316 These cases regularly involve violations of the diligence and communication provisions and sometimes will include misrepresentations to their clients and the OED.
In re Fuess in 2017 exemplifies one of the more extreme scenarios.317
Over thirty-six years of active patent practice, Fuess had prosecuted more than
three hundred applications and had no disciplinary history prior to 2008. At
that time, he neglected ten separate patent applications for four clients, which
ultimately led to abandonment. Several of these applications were for one of
his longstanding clients, who eventually confronted him about them and even310

See id.
See, e.g., In re Matlock, No. D2011-52, at 2 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Feb. 7, 2012)
(final order) (noting that the respondent missed several deadlines and claimed that “his firm had staffing problems” at the time of the neglect).
312
See id. (rejecting respondent’s claim that he made a timely response and noting that the
USPTO did not receive any such response).
313
See, e.g., In re Shaffer, No. D2014-18, at 2 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office July 31, 2014)
(final order) (finding that respondent abandoned several trademark applications and failed to inform
clients of the status of their applications).
314
See, e.g., In re Fuess, No. D2015-08, at 7 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office July 21, 2017)
(initial decision and order) (describing how respondent faced discipline after a client inquired about
the status of their abandoned application).
315
See, e.g., In re Lahser, No. D2016-27, at 4, 6 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office June 3, 2016)
(final order) (suspending practitioner for twelve months, mitigated by the fact that the practitioner
voluntarily made restitution to the client and cooperated with OED).
316
In re Fuess, No. D2015-08, at 7.
317
Id.
311
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tually replaced him with another practitioner. Fuess repeatedly shaded the
truth, first blaming it on the USPTO and eventually providing responses to the
OED in which he misrepresented the nature of his relationships with clients
and their wishes. Fuess received a three-year suspension from patent practice,
justified in part by the breadth of his neglect and misrepresentations. 318 The
initial hearing decision specifically noted that this misconduct was likely the
result of Fuess’s burgeoning patent docket. 319
Unlike the financial fool, the overwhelmed practitioner may be a patent or
trademark practitioner—though the vast majority of disciplinary actions in this
category involve patent practice. 320 The sanctions also vary widely, with a
larger percentage of public reprimands and shorter suspensions among those
practitioners who neglect fewer applications and/or are fully responsive to the
client and OED inquiries. 321
3. The Absent Advocate
Similar to the overwhelmed practitioner, the absent advocate neglects one
or more client matters—but they do so by wholly failing to communicate, either with or on behalf of clients. 322 Invariably their non-responsiveness continues even after they become subject to an OED inquiry, which exacerbates their
misconduct and leads to more punitive sanctions. 323 This category includes
those who practice patent or trademark law and they often receive sanctions in
the form of suspensions and occasionally exclusions. 324 Among the cited rule
violations are failure to cooperate with the OED, failure to communicate, and
failure to return unearned client funds.

318

Id.
See id. at 68 (“As the reasons Respondent offered for the neglect were not credible, the Director suggests that the reasons Respondent neglected the applications might be that he was overwhelmed
with work . . . .”).
320
See, e.g., In re Shaffer, No. 2014-18, at 2–6 (disciplining a trademark practitioner).
321
See, e.g., In re Hill, No. D2001-06, at 11 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office July 26, 2004)
(final decision) (reprimanding an attorney who neglected patent applications due to a firm docketing
system, in part because “Respondent owned up to the errors of his own volition, filed petitions to
revive in time to prevent any appreciable harm to his client, and paid the full costs associated with
these petitions, approximately $20,000, out of his own pocket without prodding or debate”).
322
See, e.g., In re Schaefer, No. D2007-01, at 1–2 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Apr. 30,
2007) (final order) (failing to prosecute a number of applications and communicate with clients or the
USPTO).
323
See, e.g., In re Hill, No. D2014-41, at 11–16 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Feb. 19,
2015) (initial decision on default) (failing to respond, in part or in whole, to multiple RFIs from the
OED).
324
See id.
319
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In re Dao in 2015 illustrates this category of misconduct for a practitioner
who prosecutes both patent and trademark applications. 325 After filing three
patent applications for three clients and two trademark applications for another
client, Dao became completely unresponsive to office actions and failed to
maintain client communications. He also continued to prosecute trademark
applications—and failed to inform the USPTO—when he was administratively
suspended from the practice of law by a state disciplinary authority. 326 When
the OED sent an RFI and multiple follow up notices, Dao did not respond for
six months. Though he eventually provided a response, he did not provide a
reason for his prolonged unresponsiveness. Eventually, Dao entered into a settlement agreement with the OED under which he would serve a six-month
suspension from USPTO practice. 327
4. Patent Mill Participants
Whereas the preceding categories are not unique to USPTO practice, the
patent mill is necessarily limited to patent practice. Although there are some
variations in their structure, most patent mills employ very few patent practitioners and have a larger number of non-practitioners who conduct nearly all
work for the organization. 328 The practitioners have little to no contact with the
inventor clients, relying on the non-practitioners to assist clients in navigating
the patent application process. 329 The patent mills’ services are widely advertised to prospective clients who are relatively unfamiliar with patent prosecution, and they leverage this fact—often along with unfounded claims of success—to acquire a large client base. 330 These cases involve violations of competence, the relationship with non-practitioners, and the general misconduct
provisions.
World Patent Marketing (WPM) was one of the more notorious patent
mills. 331 Its fraudulent practices were uncovered by a disgruntled customer in
No. D2015-23, at 4 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office May 15, 2015) (final order).
Id. at 3.
327
Id. at 5.
328
See, e.g., In re Colitz, Jr., No. D1999-04, at 1–2 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Jan. 2,
2003) (final decision) (committing misconduct through the Invention Submission Corporation, National Idea Network, and American Inventors Corporation, three invention development companies).
329
See id. at 32.
330
See, e.g., In re Montgomery, No. D2018-02, at 13 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Jan. 10,
2018) (final order) (“Respondent understood the general lack of sophistication of his clients, but neither Respondent nor [Montgomery Patent & Design, L.P.] ever explained to inventors the likelihood
that the inventor would receive a patent of ‘useful scope,’ as described on [the Montgomery family
businesses’] websites, if they pursued provisional, design, or utility patent protection.”).
331
See Carol D. Leonnig et al., Whitaker Fielded Early Fraud Complaints from Customers at
Patent Company Even as He Championed It, Records Show, WASH. POST (Nov. 30, 2018), https://
325
326
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conjunction with an undercover Federal Trade Commission investigation. The
company’s sole registered patent practitioner, Marina Mikhailova, filed more
than 400 patent applications under her registration number. 332 Not surprisingly,
Mikhailova did little work on the applications, relying without question on the
assertions of non-practitioner employees without verifying the details of the filings or directly communicating with clients. As a WPM employee, she received
all her compensation from the company and did not address the conflicts issues
that inherently arose. 333 Once the OED investigation began, however, she was
extremely cooperative, acknowledging her misconduct and agreeing to serve a
twenty-month suspension. 334 Scott Cooper, the CEO of WPM, has been banned
by the FTC from running an invention promotion business and forced to pay $1
million. 335 A criminal investigation is also underway. 336
Taken together, these four categories of misconduct illustrate some of the
most common types of misconduct that lead to OED investigations and public
discipline. But it must be remembered that almost half of all disciplinary actions do not originate with the USPTO; rather, they are the result of the imposition of reciprocal discipline. 337 Three of these categories—the financial fool,
overwhelmed practitioner, and absent advocate—are not unique to USPTO
practice and are easily detectable in that they leave a trail of dishonored
checks, abandoned applications, and irate clients in their wake. Although patent mills do not inherently lead to substandard results, they are structured in
such a way that some percentage of their clients will be dissatisfied with their
work. 338 Eventually, one or more of these clients may contact the USPTO and
trigger an OED investigation.
Although it is important for the OED to continue to investigate and discipline practitioners who fall into one of the preceding categories, they only reprewapo.st/3chIZLl [https://perma.cc/39QL-3TJ7] (reporting on the WPM scam that was made even
more famous by the implication that the acting U.S. Attorney General was involved).
332
In re Mikhailova, No. D2017-18, at 2 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office June 16, 2017) (final
order).
333
Id. at 3.
334
Id. at 5.
335
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Settlement Will Ban Fraudulent Marketers from
Invention Promotion Bus. (May 10, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2018/05/
ftc-settlement-will-ban-fraudulent-marketers-invention-promotion [https://perma.cc/HXT2-VZ7K].
336
Christine Wang, FBI Reportedly Investigating Company Where Trump’s Acting Attorney General Was an Advisory Board Member, CNBC (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/09/fbireportedly-probing-company-where-matthew-whitaker-was-board-member.html [https://perma.cc/
39CN-RJNB].
337
See discussion supra Part V.B.
338
See, e.g., In re Montgomery, No. D2018-02, at 2 (“Approximately, twenty percent (20%) of
inventions that were submitted for suitability review were recommended by [the Montgomery family
businesses] for a Research Report; the balance of approximately eighty percent (80%) were determined not to be suitable.”).
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sent a subset of ways in which practitioners may commit misconduct in connection with their USPTO practice. In particular, there are very few disciplinary orders that involve practitioners who overreach in connection with their work,
whether fraudulent (for example, filing a fraudulent specimen or falsely claiming
that a trademark is being used in commerce) or misleading (for example, failing
to disclose information material to patentability).339 Although these types of misconduct are somewhat harder to detect, they are arguably even more dangerous
given that an incorrectly issued patent or registered trademark can have an impact that extends beyond the practitioner-client relationship to investors, competitors, and the public at large. 340 Moreover, the USPTO has recognized the importance of regulating such misconduct by adopting regulations that require a
stricter level of practitioner candor than the ABA Rules. 341
VI. THE PATH TOWARD USPTO DISCIPLINARY REFORM
As Part V illustrates, USPTO discipline is underutilized as a tool to regulate practitioner conduct and promote good faith in the prosecution of patent
and trademark applications. Practitioner discipline rates are far below those
found in state counterparts, particularly when accounting for the high percentage of USPTO reciprocal discipline cases. The OED’s sanctioning practice,
although in some respects more punitive than its state counterparts, is aimed at
promoting specific deterrence rather than general deterrence, thereby limiting
its broader impact on the USPTO practitioner population. The actions that become the subject of discipline are largely not unique to the USPTO and are
easy to identify. The types of misconduct before the USPTO that are more likely to have an effect on the broader public interest, however, are less likely to be
subject to discipline.
Even if the lower disciplinary rates for USPTO practitioners are somewhat related to the nature of their work, the significant disparities between patent and trademark practitioners suggest that even though they are considered
equals by the OED in theory, they are in fact receiving disparate focus and
treatment. Patent practitioners are more likely to receive public discipline and
receive more punitive sanctions, despite the fact that fewer rule violations are
being cited in their disciplinary orders.
339
But see In re Swyers, No. D2016-20, at 1 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Jan. 26, 2017)
(final order) (finding exclusion by consent where trademark lawyer allowed the filing of multiple
fraudulent specimens by non-lawyer employees). Swyers is the only trademark attorney who was
disciplined on this basis, notable in its own right. See id.
340
See discussion supra Introduction; Iancu, Remarks at International Trademark Association,
supra note 8.
341
See discussion supra Part III.B.
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This Part responds to these weighty empirical findings, providing three
recommendations that aim to improve the USPTO disciplinary system. Although these recommendations may be implemented in tandem in a synergistic
fashion, each should have a positive effect. In developing these recommendations, special attention has been paid to regulating misconduct that currently
slips through the cracks because there is neither a mechanism to detect it nor
an entity (such as an adversary) that would naturally report it.
A. Recommendation 1: Trademark Attorney Registration
As discussed in Part II.B, trademark attorneys are not subject to separate
substantive admissions requirements to practice before the USPTO; they only
need to be an active member in good standing of any state bar. Nor is there an
admissions process or registration like that which exists for patent practitioners; the USPTO first learns that an attorney is prosecuting trademarks when
she files her first application on behalf of a client and provides her name and
contact information.
The lack of a trademark attorney registration system greatly impacts the
OED’s ability to regulate trademark attorneys. First, it makes it extremely difficult for the USPTO (and thereby the OED) to have an accurate picture of a
trademark attorney’s prosecution history. Currently the USPTO would have to
construct this history using the information provided on trademark application
forms. 342 But these forms require an attorney to provide little information and
have no quality control checks in place. For example, an attorney might include a middle name on one application and not another, accidentally misspell
part of their name, or legally change their name between filings. Unless a
trademark attorney is extremely vigilant and detail-oriented, it is unlikely that
the USPTO has a complete record of that attorney’s trademark filings. If each
trademark attorney had a uniquely assigned registration number, similar to patent practitioners, the OED could more easily track and monitor their work.
Second, such a registration system would allow the OED to easily identify and track those dual practitioners, i.e. those who are prosecuting both patents and trademarks. This would have at least two benefits. First, the additional detail could aid the OED’s searches for practitioners who are neglecting
multiple client matters, because those could involve both practice areas. Second, it would lessen the likelihood that a suspended or excluded patent practitioner could continue to prosecute trademark applications. This latter issue is

342
The USPTO compiles this data in its research datasets. See Trademark Case Files Dataset,
supra note 295.
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one that seems to occur with some frequency, perhaps because there is less
formal oversight of trademark attorneys. 343
Third, trademark attorney registration would provide the USPTO a better
understanding of those who are actively engaged in trademark practice. As discussed in Part V.A, currently there is no easy way to ascertain the number of
active trademark practitioners because they may choose to begin or end practice at any time without notifying the USPTO (and the data itself has a large
percentage of incorrect or suspect attorney names). Were there a trademark
attorney register, the OED could send inquiries to registered trademark attorneys about their practice as it currently does for patent practitioners and remove those who no longer intend to practice. 344 Having a register would also
significantly streamline the imposition of reciprocal discipline that appears to
be more regularly imposed for patent practitioners than their trademark counterparts. 345
Fourth, maintaining a trademark practitioner registry would provide the
USPTO with a way to communicate with those practitioners who are subject to
its regulation. This communication channel could be used to provide information of interest about emerging issues that implicate the USPTO Rules. 346
Further, it could reinforce the notion that the OED is paying attention to
trademark attorneys and that they should conduct themselves accordingly.
Although any registration system is not without cost, a trademark attorney
registration need not be as comprehensive or costly as the current patent practitioner registration system that has been maintained—seemingly without debate—for decades. In terms of the substantive admission requirements, the
USPTO could continue its practice of permitting any actively licensed attorney
to prosecute trademarks. At most, an attorney applicant would have to prove
the fact of an active admission in good standing (thereby avoiding unauthorized practice issues from the outset), provide basic contact information, and
then be assigned a unique registration number. Trademark attorneys could then
343
See, e.g., In re Frayne, No. D2016-09, at 4–5 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office June 17,
2016) (initial decision on default) (excluding practitioner who continued to represent trademark applicants and registrants before the USPTO while suspended from practice).
344
See Patent Practitioner Search, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://oedci.uspto.gov/
OEDCI/practitionerSearchEntry [https://perma.cc/6WWR-EMTC].
345
Of the 184 reciprocal discipline cases, 139 (75%) involve patent practitioners, 43 (23%) involve trademark practitioners, and 2 (1%) involve dual practitioners. The dual practitioners statistic is
low in part because there is no easy way to determine whether some of the disciplined patent practitioners also prosecute trademarks.
346
Such notices could include the new USPTO Pilot Program for reporting improper trademark
specimens. See Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, TM Specimen Protests Email Pilot
Program (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Specimen%20Protests
%20Email%20Pilot%20Program.pdf [https://perma.cc/MER2-22WD].
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incur an ongoing duty to update their information and to notify the OED if
there is a change in their state bar status.
B. Recommendation 2: Strategic USPTO Practitioner
Audits with Examiner Input
Along with the multitude of benefits that a trademark practitioner registration system could provide, the USPTO could also benefit from instituting a
strategic practitioner audit program (PAP). This idea is not entirely novel. In
2017, the USPTO instituted the Post-Registration Proof of Audit Program (Use
Audit Program) to tackle the issue of so-called “trademark dead wood,” that is,
existing registrations that no longer reflect the classes of goods and services in
which the trademark is being used in commerce. 347 Its initial pilot program was
quite successful, with over half of the randomly audited registrations containing registrations that could not be substantiated. 348
The USPTO should experiment with a different type of audit—one that focuses on practitioners rather than their work. Even though both patent and
trademark applications receive examiner review, they concentrate on whether the
application under consideration meets the relevant formal and substantive requirements. 349 By contrast, a practitioner audit would review all of the practitioner’s filings and other interactions with and representations to the USPTO to
determine the propriety of their conduct. The validity of the underlying intellectual property would be a secondary factor of this type of PAP and it is quite likely that audits would be triggered by a practitioner’s unsuccessful applications.
Although the PAP could randomly select its targets, experience suggests
that such audits would be more effective if they were conducted strategically—
similar to a tax audit. 350 Among the criteria that could be considered in deter347
Post Registration Proof of Use Audit Program, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://
www.uspto.gov/trademarks-maintaining-trademark-registration/post-registration-audit-program [https://
perma.cc/96Q6-ZCSQ]; see Emily Kappers & Howard Michael, Cutting the Dead Wood: The
USPTO’s Post-Registration Trademark Use Audit Program, NAT’L L. REV. (Nov. 16, 2018),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/cutting-dead-wood-uspto-s-post-registration-trademark-useaudit-program [https://perma.cc/6QRZ-X2CZ] (touting the success of the pilot program and discussing the full rollout).
348
See Kappers & Michael, supra note 347.
349
See SUE A. PURVIS, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, THE ROLE OF THE PATENT EXAMINER 8–9 (2013), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/about/offices/ous/04082013_StonyBrookU.
pdf [https://perma.cc/22HV-3MKG] (describing the role of the patent examiner as requiring the examiner to “[i]ssue [v]alid [p]atents” and to “[a]ct as an advocate for the [p]ublic” in ensuring that patents
are only issued in accordance with the law).
350
See IRS Audits, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businessesself-employed/irs-audits [https://perma.cc/LR72-YJ25] (“[S]ometimes returns are selected based solely on a statistical formula. We compare your tax return against ‘norms’ for similar returns. We develop these ‘norms’ from audits of a statistically valid random sample of returns, as part of the National
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mining which practitioners to audit would be those having a relatively high
percentage of denied applications. Though this fact is not dispositive of misconduct, this may be an indication that a practitioner is either intentionally or
recklessly overreaching in their work. Over time, additional audit criteria could
be identified and eventually an algorithm could be developed to pinpoint suspect activities with precision. 351
But the first line of defense against practitioner misconduct is already in
place. In the course of their daily work, patent and trademark examiners are
reviewing numerous applications and responses filed by practitioners. Not every examination denial (or even the vast majority) will indicate potential practitioner misconduct, but denials could help examiners identity practitioners who
should be subject to the PAP or, in more egregious cases, make a direct referral
to the OED. Although the frequency of these direct referrals is not publicly
known, the overwhelming majority of disciplinary actions appears to have
originated from identifiable financial misconduct or from neglect that later became apparent to a client. 352
Instituting the PAP will come at a cost. An audit process must be identified
and executed, requiring auditors to extensively review practitioner conduct and
engage with audited practitioners. In addition, it will likely lead to additional
OED investigations and formal processes. These expenses, however, are justified
if it is assumed that the USPTO should be increasing the frequency of its discipline. Further, the PAP could be streamlined over to defray some of these costs.
The USPTO could facilitate greater information sharing between the examiners
and auditors, which should theoretically decrease the auditors’ work. Audited
practitioners would also be required to respond to a series of questions (similar
to an RFI), which would then guide the rest of the audit.
As with the first recommendation, the PAP could provide a number of
secondary benefits as well. First, the audits could reveal fraudulent or otherwise ineligible patents or trademarks. The revelation of fraud is in and of itself
a concern worth addressing, but this could also tackle rising concerns about

Research Program the IRS conducts. The IRS uses this program to update return selection information.”). In spite of decreases in IRS personnel, the threat of a tax audit is heavily discussed and tied
to particular categories of reported activities. See Thomas Heath, Your Chances of an IRS Audit Are
Way Down. But Keep It on the Up and Up., WASH. POST (Apr. 6, 2018), https://wapo.st/3bhkkq2
[https://perma.cc/8S8U-5RRG].
351
Cf. Ting Sun & Miklos A. Vasarhelyi, Deep Learning and the Future of Auditing, CPA J.
(June 2017), https://www.cpajournal.com/2017/06/19/deep-learning-future-auditing/ [https://perma.
cc/5VXN-RN3S] (discussing the use of artificial intelligence to improve the effectiveness of auditing
in the accounting context).
352
See discussion supra Part V.C (discussing the common patterns of misconduct).
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depletion and clutter. 353 Second, the PAP could have a deterrent effect on those
practitioners who are subject to an audit. Even if the audit does not reveal misconduct giving rise to formal discipline, the audit findings could dissuade
those practitioners from continuing certain practices that could lead to future
discipline. Third, and perhaps more importantly, the potential of being subject
to an audit could have a general deterrent effect on high volume practitioners
who might otherwise be susceptible to committing misconduct in the face of a
growing docket and demanding clients. 354
C. Recommendation 3: Broader Dissemination
of OED Disciplinary Function
There is existing literature on the advantages of ensuring that the work of
a state disciplinary authority is adequately publicized to practitioners and
members of the general public. 355 Information about disciplinary actions can
increase practitioners’ knowledge about the types of misconduct that they
should guard against. 356 The public dissemination of practitioner discipline
also has an expressive component as well, signaling to practitioners that the

353
See Barton Beebe & Jeanne C. Fromer, Are We Running Out of Trademarks? An Empirical
Study of Trademark Depletion and Congestion, 131 HARV. L. REV. 945, 1041 (2018) (concluding that
trademark depletion and congestion is a real concern, despite popular belief to the contrary).
354
Cf. Joshua D. Blank & Daniel Z. Levin, When Is Tax Enforcement Publicized?, 30 VA. TAX
REV. 1, 21–23 (2010) (discussing the deterrent effect of publicizing criminal tax convictions and the
threat of tax audit). The deterrent effect of tax audits is discussed in the tax literature. See, e.g., Susan
Cleary Morse et al., Cash Businesses and Tax Evasion, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 37, 64 (2009). One
article notes:

Most studies show that the [general deterrence] effect of audits overwhelms the direct
revenue effect. One recent study estimates the general deterrence effect is over ten
times the direct revenue effect, and that a doubling of audit funding at the federal level
would increase taxes by as much as 60 times the cost of the additional audits.
Id.

355
See Levin, supra note 239, at 2 (identifying the benefits and drawbacks of greater transparency, and concluding that the benefits outweigh the drawbacks). One author writes:

Making disciplinary proceedings more available to the public, particularly by ensuring
access to online records as the digital age requires, advances several goals the ABA has
set for attorney discipline, including consistency in punishments, attorney awareness of
wrongful conduct, integrity of the legal profession, protecting and educating the public,
ensuring effective assistance, and creating competition for clients.
Desch, supra note 239, at 923 (citations omitted).
356
See Changes to Representation of Others Before the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 78 Fed. Reg. 20,178, 20,180 (Apr. 3, 2013) (to be codified in scattered parts of 37 C.F.R.) (contemplating that practitioners would use disciplinary actions, both from the USPTO and other jurisdictions, to inform their understanding of ethical conduct).
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OED is committed to ensuring that practitioners act in accordance with the
USPTO Rules. 357
For the general public, broader dissemination of OED discipline can raise
awareness about the disciplinary process and increase the likelihood that clients and other affected persons will report complaints to the OED for investigation. Furthermore, it can have a positive impact on the public’s belief that
the USPTO is operating as an effective gatekeeper for the issuance of patents
and trademarks. 358
Currently the USPTO does very little to publicize the OED’s disciplinary
function. The OED section of the website is difficult to navigate and requires
users to actively look for information on discipline. There is no public information on the website about the imposition of warning letters (private discipline), including the number of letters issued or the types of misconduct that
give rise to such letters. 359 Although the OED Reading Room website allows
users to search for public discipline, users need to understand how disciplinary
actions are organized in order to perform an effective search. Even then, the
search returns PDF versions of documents with descriptive labels such as “Final Order,” which means that a user has to read the entire document to learn
the specifics about the practitioner’s misconduct and sanction imposed.360
Again, there is no compiled information on the public website about the frequency of public discipline or the types of misconduct that may lead to public
discipline.
This Article suggests a variety of measures that could increase the visibility
and understanding of USPTO discipline, which vary in terms of the administrative time required. First, the USPTO website could be redesigned so that discipline would be featured more prominently. A few simple changes to the site architecture and menu would enable website users to quickly find information
about the OED’s disciplinary function and ways that aggrieved persons can provide relevant material to the OED so that it can begin an investigation. 361

357
See generally Mark J. Fucile, Public Discipline Is More “Public” Than Ever: The Impact of
Web-Based Lawyer Rating Services on Discipline, 24 PROF. LAW. 1 (2016) (discussing the impact of
publicity of attorney discipline on lawyer conduct).
358
Cf. Carpenter & Cluderay, supra note 241, at 739–40 (discussing the public benefit to increased transparency of attorney disciplinary proceedings).
359
The USPTO presents selected statistics at its Patent Law Institute but the files and data are not
posted consistently on the USPTO website. See generally USPTO Presentation, supra note 146.
360
See FOIA Documents, supra note 163.
361
For an example of a well-designed and comprehensive site, see Lawyer Discipline, N.C. ST.
BAR, https://www.ncbar.gov/lawyer-discipline/ [https://perma.cc/4MLC-E3TA]. From the main page,
users can search past disciplinary orders, read a roadmap of the disciplinary process, view annual
disciplinary reports, and learn how to file a grievance or engage in alternative dispute resolution. Id.
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Second, the USPTO website could include pages related to the disciplinary process and data on the imposition of private and public discipline. Even
though the specific contents of warning letters should remain private, there is
an opportunity to share redacted information on these troubling actions that
could, if repeated, lead to the imposition of public discipline. 362
Third, the USPTO website could include clear and easily accessible information about the imposition of public discipline for specific practitioners.
Instead of requiring interested persons to read through numerous (and often
lengthy) documents to glean an understanding of USPTO public discipline, the
USPTO could produce short summaries of these actions and publish them on
the website. 363 Although some of the Official Gazette notices include such information, they are not written at a consistent level of detail and are not compiled together in one location for reference or review.
Fourth, the USPTO could develop a series of formal ethics opinions.
These types of opinions are frequently published by state disciplinary authorities and enable the authority to communicate definitive guidance on frequently
encountered or emerging issues. 364 At their best, these formal opinions can
guide practitioner conduct so that they do not become the subject of an investigation. If not complied with, the formal ethics opinions can aptly demonstrate
that a practitioner committed misconduct. 365
With regard to the costs associated with the foregoing suggestions, the
first three would take little administrative time and expense. The USPTO compiles much of this information for other purposes already, and thus the additional time would be for altering the website architecture, creating a modest
amount of web-friendly content, and then making regular updates. 366 Though
formal ethics opinions would take significantly more time to craft and publish,
they could have considerably greater deterrent value—particularly given the
low number of formal disciplinary decisions that have been published since the
2013 adoption of the USPTO Rules. Indeed, the USPTO had contemplated that
362
See, e.g., OFFICE OF COUNSEL, N.C. STATE BAR, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT 5–12 (2019), https://
www.ncbar.gov/media/730494/2018-counsel-annual-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/98KQ-EQGD] (providing a comprehensive report of activities of the Office of Counsel, including summaries of major disciplinary actions).
363
See, e.g., Archived Issues, STATE BAR CAL., http://www.calbar.ca.gov/About-Us/NewsEvents/California-Bar-Journal/Attorney-Discipline/attorney-who-flouted-court-orders-stripped-oflaw-license [https://perma.cc/F89D-DH5U] (providing updates on latest disciplinary actions).
364
For an example of a comprehensive website containing formal ethics opinions, see Adopted
Opinions, N.C. STATE BAR, https://www.ncbar.gov/for-lawyers/ethics/adopted-opinions/ [https://
perma.cc/DMS7-8S79].
365
See Alice Neece Mine, How the State Bar Rules on Questions of Legal Ethics, N.C. ST. B. Q.,
Spring 1994, at 6, 6 (discussing the significance of formal ethics opinions and ethics advisories in
North Carolina).
366
See generally USPTO Presentation, supra note 146.
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practitioners would be able to increasingly use disciplinary decisions to guide
their conduct, a circumstance that has not come to fruition. 367
CONCLUSION
Over the last several decades, the USPTO has come to recognize the critical role that practitioners play in the provision and enforcement of intellectual
property rights. They serve as trusted technical and legal intermediaries between applicants and the USPTO—simultaneously expected to advocate for
their clients and act in good faith by fully disclosing information that could
potentially damage their clients’ chances of success. It is for these reasons that
the USPTO has invested significant energy in professionalizing the practitioner
ranks, both for admissions and discipline. The OED has considerable infrastructure and processes already in place. Without knowing more, one might
assume that the OED is likewise acting in a manner similar to other state disciplinary authorities in regulating practitioners.
Yet as the results of this original empirical study have demonstrated, the
OED has failed to fully leverage its disciplinary authority, particularly in its
regulation of trademark attorneys. Overall, practitioner discipline rates are less
than one-fourth of that which is imposed by state authorities, and nearly half of
the OED’s cases involve the imposition of reciprocal discipline imposed by
another state. Furthermore, trademark discipline comprises less than onequarter of all OED cases, and trademark attorneys generally receive less punitive sanctions than do patent practitioners despite violating more ethics rules
on average. This disparity between patent- and trademark-related discipline
may not be all that surprising, however, given the differences in how the
USPTO regulates these two groups of professionals.
Over the sixteen-year period under study, USPTO discipline was used
primarily as a tool to regulate individual practitioners who have committed
easily detected types of misconduct. Three of the four common patterns of
misconduct that were identified and described—the financial fool, overcommitted practitioner, and absent advocate—are not unique to patent practice and
do not relate to the central place that the duties of candor and good faith occupy in the USPTO’s regulatory purpose.
With fraudulent and suspicious activity before the USPTO on the rise, it
is now time for the OED to use its disciplinary authority to more effectively
serve the public interest. With the adoption of the newest version of the
USPTO Rules, there is already a regulatory mechanism in place to sanction
367
See Changes to Representation of Others Before the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 78 Fed. Reg. at 20,180.
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these types of misconduct. But this mechanism has largely gone unused and its
workings are largely unknown, even to those who are subject to it.
The three recommendations provided in this Article present a first step
towards strategically leveraging the threat of practitioner discipline to promote
more ethical conduct before the USPTO. Rather than being conceived as draconian measures, however, these recommendations reinforce the notion that
USPTO practitioners are entrusted to act responsibly and in good faith—not
only in relation to their individual clients, but also in their entire practice before the USPTO.
This Article also has provided a blueprint for how to conduct empirical
studies of practitioner/attorney discipline, which can be emulated for other disciplinary authorities so that they may better understand and improve their
work. In conducting the background research in preparation for this study, the
author was surprised that there is very little scholarly work on the subject. Additional studies would enable disciplinary authorities to identify best practices
and to align their work in accordance with their mission and the purposes of
discipline that they wish to prioritize and promote, as was done for the USPTO
in this Article.

